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Past research in the psychology of extremism has argued that extremism is a 
psychological state characterized by a perception that the group is absolutely correct, 
endowed with moral authority, and threatened or opposed by some active group or entity 
working against the ingroup.  There has been little research which has focused on what 
psychological processes may underlie this state.  It is proposed in this dissertation that 
extremism is an outgrowth of identity fusion, a state in which the personal and social 
levels of the self-concept become closely aligned so that they may not be activated 
independently of each other.  Identity fusion is theorized to follow from self-verification 
motives interacting with salient social identities, so that when people need verification for 
the way they see themselves and a group which provides such verification is activated, 
fusion may result.  Three studies were conducted to examine different aspects of the 
identity fusion-extremism link.  In Study 1, experimenters manipulated the need for self-
verification motives and the social context to determine if self-verification predicted the 
viii
development of fusion with a verifying, salient group.  This study found little evidence of 
this link.  Study 2 used counterattitudinal messages to assess the link between fusion and 
absolutist patterns of thinking.  Fused participants were found to show significantly more 
emotional response to and rejection of counterattidudinal messages, in line predictions.
Finally, Study 3 examined the behavioral and linguistic correlates of fusion and found 
some evidence that fusion predicted self-reported behaviors in line with political 
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  Chapter 1: Introduction
Recent events have focused international attention on the phenomenon of 
extremism.  The attacks in America, Spain, Britain, and elsewhere have forced the world 
to look at topics of group conflict, revenge, anger, and a host of other related concerns.  
These attacks and their violent aftershocks around the world pose a clear question for 
social psychology.  They demonstrate that in the service of their ideals, people can be 
motivated to kill others, to suffer massive costs to their personal comfort and well-being, 
and even to extinguish themselves if they see a particular benefit to these actions.  These 
phenomena should fascinate social psychology, where the basic human motivations are 
assumed to revolve in some fashion or another around self-protection.  Whether 
discussing the core human social motives of enhancement (e.g. Taylor & Brown, 1988), 
self-verification (Swann, 1984), or just the basic fear of death (Solomon, Greenberg, & 
Pyszczynski, 1991), a core assumption in social psychology is that individuals are 
motivated by a desire to protect the self from harm, change, or extinction.  The fact that 
some causes or groups are able to override this desire to the point where people will 
undertake actions harmful or lethal to the self suggests that some powerful psychological 
process must be operating in these situations.  An examination of this process, and 
exactly what is happening in the case of extremist behavior, has the potential to 
contribute a great deal to our understanding of both extremist behavior specifically and 
also human motivations and processes in general.
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However, despite the academic and applied utility of this research, extremism has 
been relatively under-studied in social psychology, and rarely as a state in and of itself.  
For the most part, research on extremism has been found in work on group conflict or the 
development of prejudice, which has focused primarily on what conditions lead 
individuals to reject or engage in conflict with other groups.  This research has mainly 
focused on the phenomenon at the level of generalized affect or negative beliefs about 
outgroups.  Research on the specific psychological state of those individuals most likely 
to engage in violent, aggressive, or even self-damaging behavior in the service of the 
group has been less common.
This dissertation seeks to expand research on extremism by examining the 
psychological correlates of extremism, especially those related to the impact of self and 
social identity processes on extremist attitudes and behavior.  It is proposed that 
extremism, a psychological state characterized by a belief that a group that an individual 
belongs to is morally right, absolutely correct, and threatened by active outgroups, is 
related to a particular construction of the self-concept.  This construction is one in which 
the group membership comes to dominate the members’ social worlds to the extent that it 
becomes a fundamental part of their self-definition.  The motivation for this is assumed to 
be related to self-verification, a desire to be seen by others in the same way as the person 
sees him or herself.  Past research on extremism, self and social identity is examined, and 
three studies are presented which attempt to expand the existing understanding of 
extremism.
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EXTREMISM: DEFINITION AND PAST RESEARCH
Before addressing the main questions of this proposal, it is necessary to define 
one of the basic terms.  Extremism has been somewhat under-studied in social 
psychology, and most research on extremism and extremist behavior in social psychology 
has focused on group conflict and those situational factors that lead a group towards 
violent actions against another (e.g. Olzak, Shanahan, & McEarney, 1996;  Jackson, 
1993).  This approach is problematic, in that these theories are applied at the level of the 
group and do not satisfactorily explain the specific psychology of the individual group 
members acting in extremist ways (Glaser, Dixit, & Green 2002; Turpin-Petrosino, 
2002).  The result is that, while social scientists do know a fair amount about the 
conditions in which group tensions are likely to increase, there is less general agreement 
on the conditions that lead someone to join a group that has an extremist ideology or to 
develop an extremist mindset once they are in the group.  Moreover, there is not a 
generally accepted definition for what characterizes an extremist mindset.
The definition of extremism used in this research is drawn from what research 
there is on the psychology of extremism, and is generated from those points of agreement 
found in the literature.  For the most part, researchers seem to agree that extremists show 
three specific characteristics.  These are:
1. The belief that the group is endowed with moral authority in its beliefs or 
teachings, so that belonging to or agreeing with this group is a moral good.
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2. The belief that the group is absolutely correct, so that the group’s beliefs cannot 
be argued with or subdivided, and
3. The belief that the group is actively threatened or opposed by other groups.
The first tenet, the belief that the group is morally correct, is consistently shown 
to be an important part of distinguishing between extremist and non-extremist groups 
(Smith, 2004; McCormick 2003; Crenshaw, 2000).  When a group is seen as moral, 
rather than simply logically correct, belonging to that group becomes a moral imperative.  
People who disagree with the group are seen as acting immorally, a belief which makes it 
easier for the extremist to develop negative attitudes towards outgroup members (Sande, 
Goethals, Ferrari, & Worth, 1989).
The second tenet, the belief that the group is absolutely correct, is widely seen as 
another element that characterizes the psychology of extremism (Haslam & Turner, 1995; 
Baron, Crawley, & Paulina 2003; Altemeyer & Hunsberger 1992; 2004).  Because the 
group is seen as wholly correct in all its teachings, the distinction between an ingroup 
(and therefore moral) and an outgroup (and therefore immoral) person is sharp and 
distinct.  Any deviation from the teachings or beliefs of the ingroup is enough to mark an 
individual as not belonging to the ingroup.  This makes the distinction between the 
ingroup and the outgroup a sharp binary, rather than a question of degrees of similarity 
(Haslam & Turner, 1995).
The third tenet, the belief that the ingroup is beset by active outgroups working 
against it, is sometimes presented as a result of other elements of extremism, and 
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sometimes as an inherent component of extremism (e.g. Altemeyer & Hunsberger 1992).  
It is a very common element of extremist belief, and is bolstered by the first two elements 
of extremism.  If an extremist sees the world as being filled with outgroups (because of 
the absolutist perspective) and these outgroups as being immoral (because of the moral 
authority of the group), it is a small step to see these outgroups as actively working 
against the ingroup.  A focus on the threat that other groups pose to the ingroup is a very 
common element in the arguments made by the leaders of extremist groups (Glaser, 
Dixit, & Green, 2002; Post, 2003). 
This dissertation will use these three elements as a definition of the psychological 
state of extremism.  This research seeks to identify a psychological explanation of the 
underlying process or psychological conditions that cause the development of this state.  
Existing research, while contributing to our understanding of the phenomenon of 
extremism, has currently failed to develop an explanation that fully describes why some 
individuals may develop an extremist mindset while others do not, or why extremist 
groups may be attractive to some individuals and not to others.  The current research 
addresses these gaps.
EXTREMISM: POPULAR USAGE VS. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL DEFINITION
It is worth distinguishing the usage of the term extremism in this dissertation from 
the way it is often used in popular discourse.  Most often, when the terms “extremist” or 
“extremist group” are used in public discourse or text (and in many academic works as 
well), they are referring to terrorist organizations, cults, or other groups which are defined 
as extremist by holding beliefs not shared by mainstream society or using methods to 
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advance their beliefs which are condemned by the majority.  In this usage, the term 
“extremist” identifies the distance between the perspectives of these groups and what is 
seen as socially normal or acceptable.  It also carries a strong negative connotation, as it’s 
often used to refer to violent groups.  This is a usage of the word extremism which is 
quite distinct from the psychological definition used in this dissertation.  In this 
dissertation, the term extremism is used to refer to the specific psychological state 
described above.  The axis on which individuals are extreme is not defined by what is 
considered normative by society, but rather the degree to which they are committed to 
their group and its goals.  Because of this, it is perfectly plausible for a person defined as 
an extremist on this definition to behave in ways which are far from being seen as 
unacceptable by society.  Because extremism is defined as the belief that the group is
morally right, absolutely correct, and under some threat rather than by any specific 
doctrinal or behavioral trait, the actual visible outcomes of extremism as defined here 
should be strongly determined by the overt teachings of the group.  Any group which has 
a moral element to its’ organizational beliefs could potentially support an extremist 
alignment with the group, but the behavioral impact of this alignment is likely to be 
dramatically different in the case of prosocial groups such as antialcoholism 
organizations or religious institutions than in the case of antisocial groups such as racist 
organizations.  Research on the relationship between anonymity and social influence has 
demonstrated that group norms have a powerful impact on whether the behavior 
associated with group affiliation is prosocial or more antisocial (Johnson & Downing, 
1979), and the conception of extremism used in this study extends this work .
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It is certainly the case that the psychological state of extremism described here 
lays the groundwork for the development of the kind of violence and radical behavior
associated with the popular conception of extremist groups, and it is likely that this state 
is a necessary precondition for the endorsement of these violent ideologies.  However, as 
the research on group norms and prosocial behavior illustrates, it is not the case that it is 
necessary and sufficient.
Much of the research discussed in this dissertation will focus on violent or 
antisocial extremist groups, because these are the groups which are the most visible and 
the most easily classified as having a large number of extremist members without direct 
psychological assessment of the members and also because this is what the majority of 
existing research has focused on.  However, this should not be taken as an endorsement 
of the idea that all people who meet the psychological definition of extremism are 
inherently violent, or that these groups characterize the entire domain of extremism.  The 
three studies presented in this dissertation underscore this difference by using affiliation 
with mainstream political groups as a model for extremism, a domain which rarely sparks 
radical or violent behavior in America.
.  
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Chapter 2: Psychological Perspectives on Extremism
REALISTIC GROUP CONFLICT THEORY
The majority of research in social psychology on the topics of extremism or 
extremist behavior has focused on the question of identifying and explaining radically 
pro-group behavior, especially that which is directed at punishing or attacking an 
outgroup.  Because of this, early research in extremist behavior has focused on explaining 
extremism in terms of group interactions, and especially focusing on those conditions that 
lead to group conflict (whether political/social conflict or violent conflict).
Beginning with Sherif’s Robbers’ Cave experiments (Sherif, Harvey, White, 
Hood, & Sherif, 1961), one important thread in this research has been the question of 
realistic or economic conflicts.  Realistic Group Conflict Theory (RGCT) (Sherif, 1966) 
argues that group conflicts (and from this, extremist behavior) arise from real competition 
between groups.  In this theory, competition for resources leads to group hostility, 
including cognitive and attitudinal elements that support this hostility (Jackson, 1993; 
Zarate, Garcia, Garza, & Hitlan, 2004). 
While research in RGCT has shown a connection between economic conflicts and 
behaviors associated with extremism, (Hovland & Sears, 1940), using it to describe the 
psychology of extremism at the level of the individual has not been very effective.  To 
the extent that RGCT predicts that one individual will develop an extremist mindset, 
RGCT would suggest that those group members who are most aware of the competition 
or most personally threatened by competition with other groups should be the most 
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extremist.  Empirical tests of this hypothesis have consistently demonstrated that this is 
not the case.  Members of white supremacist groups in North Carolina show no more 
concern about their economic prospects than nonmembers (Green, Abelson, & Garnett 
1999), and examinations of hate group speech on the Internet has found that racists are 
least likely to advocate violence in the context of economic competition between races, 
compared to other scenarios that focus on neighborhood integration or intermarriage 
(Glaser, Dixit, & Green, 2002).  Research into hate group members’ reasons for joining 
has also found that interpersonal connections, more than economic concerns, seem to 
drive membership in extremist organizations (Turpin-Petrosino, 2002; Ezekiel 1995; 
2002).
This research strongly suggests that while RGCT is an effective predictor of the 
general level of tensions and conflict between groups, it is not a good explanation for the 
psychology of extremism.  While competition may affect the conflict between two 
groups, it does not adequately explain why one group member may develop extremist 
attachments to the group, and another may not.  For a full explanation of extremism, it is 
obvious that other mechanisms than realistic conflict must be invoked.
SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY
Research on group processes and intergroup tensions in general has come to 
similar realization that RGCT, while contributing greatly to our understanding of group 
processes, cannot explain everything (Brown & Capozza, 2000).  Group members do not 
always act to ensure that their group maximizes economic rewards, but instead often 
prefer to maximize the difference between their group and outgroups (Tajfel, Billig, 
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Bundy, & Flament, 1971; Turner, Brown, & Tajfel 1979).  Researchers in social identity 
have argued that this puzzling group dynamic can only be explained by developing a 
greater appreciation for the role of the self-concept and how it is affected by the groups 
individuals belong to.  Social identity theory (SIT) (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) argues that 
individuals who are members of a group incorporate that group into their understanding 
of who they are.  To the extent that the group members see themselves as identifying with 
a group, that group becomes a part of their self-identity.  As a result, motivations relevant 
to the self, such as self-enhancement, become active at the level of the group as well as 
the individual self, and group members act in the service of these self-relevant motives 
even when such behaviors are objectively not beneficial to the individual (Turner, Brown, 
& Tajfel 1979).
In examining the psychology of extremism, SIT provides a perspective with the 
potential to resolve the gaps left by realistic group conflict theory.  Research in SIT has 
strongly confirmed the hypothesis that identity concerns are related to many group 
relevant behaviors, making the suggestion that identity concerns are a part of extremist 
behaviors a logical extension of this work.  Empirical evidence supports the idea that 
extremism is more related to identity-related concerns than realistic conflict.  In an 
examination of online discussion by racists, Glaser and colleagues (Glaser, Dixit, & 
Green, 2002) found that racists were most likely to advocate violent action when 
prompted with a story about Black-White intermarriage rather than other scenarios.  Also, 
statements advocating violence in response to many scenarios focused on the perceived 
distinctiveness and “purity” of the group identity.  This strongly suggests that it is the 
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conception of the group and the group identity which drives the members of these groups 
to commit extremist actions, rather than any perception of economic conflict between the 
groups.
Research drawn from SIT therefore supports the idea that the self-concept and 
self-related motives are likely to play a role in explaining the psychology of extremism.  
However, some specific predictions that SIT makes do not adequately explain the 
psychology of extremism.  Specifically, social identity theory proposes that the primary 
motivations for identifying strongly with a group are a desire for self-enhancement and, 
more recently, uncertainty reduction (Hogg & Terry, 2000).  These motives fail to 
describe the development of extremism.
Research in the motivations of identification with a group has placed self-
enhancement as the primary motive, suggesting that identification with high-status 
groups is desired for the boost in self-esteem it provides (Ellemers, Van Knippenberg, 
DeVries, & Wilke, 1988).  This would suggest that identification and extremism should 
be found only in high status groups.  While members of high-status groups can develop 
extremist behaviors in the service of protecting the status of their ingroup (Sidanious, 
Pratto, van Laar, & Levin, 2004), there are many examples of extremist groups organized 
around social groups considered to be low status (e.g. Bonney, 1977, O’Connor, 1998).  
One political scientist has even argued that low-status groups that are a numerical 
majority are the most likely groups to develop extremist ideologies (Chua, 2003).  Of 
course, one argument is that these groups represent an attempt to make a low-status group 
positive in the service of self-enhancement.  While this is certainly a reasonable 
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interpretation, it presupposes a kind of extreme identification with the group and 
therefore a need to make that group positive.  This is an inversion of the traditional 
description used by social identity theory, which argues that identification is the result of
enhancement rather than the other way around.  This interpretation begs the question of 
reasons for this radical identification with the group.  While many high-status groups do 
develop extremist leanings, enhancement alone cannot explain the existence of all 
extremist groups. 
Research focusing on less extremist behaviors has also failed to support the idea 
that enhancement is the primary motive for all ingroup behavior.  Even in experimental 
settings, people have been shown to identify strongly with low-status groups (Turner, 
Hogg, Turner, & Smith, 1984).  A recent meta-analysis found no evidence that 
enhancement motives underlay discrimination against outgroups, as SIT would predict 
(Rubin & Hewstone, 1998).  Social identity theorists have responded to these criticisms 
by developing the argument that uncertainty reduction may also play a role in what 
groups an individual becomes highly identified with.  From this perspective, individuals 
are motivated to affiliate with groups in response to events which make them uncertain 
about their understanding of the world or their place in it.  When group members feel 
uncertain about their personal feelings, beliefs, or understanding of the world, they are 
moved to affiliate with a group and to self-categorize, or modify their self-concept to be 
more in line with the prototype of the group they belong to.  In doing so, they receive 
feedback from other group members that reassures them they are correct in their beliefs.
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The uncertainty reduction hypothesis has received empirical support in laboratory 
settings focusing on non-extremist affiliation with groups (Grieve & Hogg, 1999; Hogg 
& Grieve 1999).  However, there are some theoretical concerns which make uncertainty 
reduction an incomplete explanation for affiliation with groups, and extremism by 
extension.  Most significantly, if uncertainty reduction itself is considered to be the prime 
motive, there is no direct reason why uncertainty about things such as the person’s beliefs 
about their capacity to perform on a “NASA survival task” must be related to their 
affiliation with a group.  Presumably, the most effective form of feedback that would 
reduce uncertainty about things such as intellectual ability would be feedback about 
intellectual ability, not group membership.  Categorization theorists argue that it is the 
salience of a particular group at the moment of uncertainty that makes that group likely to 
be seized upon as a tool for uncertainty reduction (Hogg & Terry, 2000), but do not 
adequately explain why the group, rather than behavior focused specifically upon the 
domain of uncertainty, should be the preferred source for uncertainty reduction.
This problem is particularly pointed when looking at the psychology of 
extremism.  There is some evidence that people who are insecure about their social 
standing or uncertain about the way they see themselves are more likely to join extremist 
groups such as Neo-Nazi or racist organizations (Turpin-Petrosino, 2002).  However, the 
relatively low prevalence and extremely low status of extremist groups in America 
provides a problem to the uncertainty reduction hypothesis as it is currently framed.  If 
uncertainty-caused group affiliation and categorization is focused on those groups which 
are salient at the moment of uncertainty, then the likelihood of an individual being 
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attracted to a specific extremist group should exactly correlate with the likelihood of that 
group being salient and active at the point of uncertainty.  This in turn strongly implies 
that it is unlikely that people should seek out groups for the purpose of joining, but 
instead focus on whatever groups they already belong to, as these groups are much more 
likely to be a salient and immediate avenue to reduce uncertainty.  Studies of extremist 
groups find that while some people are recruited, often members of these groups seek 
these groups out and actively work to join groups that they may not have had any 
interaction with.  An example of this can be seen in the Internet presence of neo-Nazi 
groups, which has posed a serious threat for law enforcement.  Many people committing 
racially motivated attacks are people who sought out affiliation with extremist groups 
online, choosing to affiliate with these groups without ever being approached by a 
physical recruiter (Levin, 2002).  From the perspective of uncertainty reduction as a 
simple motive, it is difficult to explain how these distant groups could be seen as a 
relevant source for uncertainty reduction.
The current state of the research, then, is that there is evidence that extremism is 
an outgrowth of the way a group member constructs his or her identity.  Something about 
the way that the group member sees their membership in the group, and the way that this 
group membership is seen in relation to the general identity of the individual, supports 
the characteristics that define the psychology of extremism.  The specific construction of 
identity related to extremist attitudes and the underlying motivation that would lead an 
individual to affiliate so strongly with a group are currently unknown.  Explanations that 
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seek to seat extremism in motivations of self-enhancement or uncertainty reduction in the 
broad definition are unable to account for the observed cases of extremist attitudes.  
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Chapter 3: Self-Verification: A New Social Motive?
One potential explanation for the current state of affairs can be found in the fact 
that theories relating to social identity have failed to fully appreciate the full range of 
human social motives.  The strength of SIT was that it allowed researchers to look at 
social behavior and identification with social groups through the lens of personal 
motives.  However, when researchers in SIT and related theories have put this insight into 
practice, the primary motivations focused on have been only those of enhancement and 
uncertainty reduction.  While important, these motivations are only a part of the core 
motives that people seek to fulfill in social situations (Fiske, 2004).  By appreciating the 
role of other motives in social interaction, it may be possible to fill in some gaps in the 
existing literature on social identity.
One important social motivation that has currently remained unstudied in social 
identity research is self-verification, or the desire for individuals to be seen by others in 
the same way they see themselves (Swann, 1983; Swann, Rentfrow, & Guinn, 2003).  
Self-verification theory proposes that one fundamental social motive that people have is 
to strive to confirm their existing self-views.  For both epistemic reasons (in that
receiving reinforcement for your self-views reassures you that these views are correct) 
and pragmatic reasons (in that receiving affirmation of your self-views suggests that the 
affirming individual will interact with you in an appropriate manner) people should prefer 
social interactions and environments that verify their self-views.  Research supports this 
prediction, in that many studies have demonstrated that when given a choice, people will 
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choose to interact with others who see them as they see themselves, even if that means 
that they are selecting interaction partners who see them quite negatively (Swann, 
Pelham, & Krull, 1989; Swann, Wenzlaff, & Tafarodi, 1992).  Similarly, people are more 
likely to remain in marriages (Burke & Stets, 1999) and college roommate relationships 
(Swann & Pelham, 2002) when their partner gives them verifying feedback than when 
they do not.  In all, almost twenty years of research have consistently confirmed that self-
verification is an important human social motive.
SELF-VERIFICATION AS A MOTIVE FOR SOCIAL IDENTITY
Despite this research, social identity theory has not yet seriously considered the 
role that self-verification motives may play in shaping social self-views.  Similarly, self-
verification theory has historically steered mostly clear of examining social identity 
phenomena.  This is in line with the traditional way that research has been carried out in 
social psychology, which has for the most part drawn a sharp distinction between the 
different aspects of the self concept.  Research in the construction of the self has for 
many years drawn a distinction between the individual self, or those aspects of the self-
concept which describe the person as an individual, and the social self, or those aspects of 
the self concept that tie a person to broader social or relational groups (James, 1890; 
Prentice, 2001).  For the most part, these two aspects of the self-identity are assumed to 
be distinct, located in separate parts of the cognitive organization, and capable of being 
activated independently of each other (Trafimow, Triandis, & Goto, 1991).  While it is 
acknowledged that, as both the personal and the social self are different elements of the 
overall self-identity there are clearly connections between the two elements (Reid & 
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Deaux, 1996), most research has tended to focus on one aspect of the self more than the 
other.
However, recent work has expanded research in self-verification to demonstrate 
that self-verification motives are active at the level of the social self as well as the 
personal self.  When given a chance, people indicate a strong preference for interacting 
with those who share their image of the groups that they belong to and provide feedback 
that supports the way that they see these groups (Chen, Chen, & Shaw, 2004; Gomez, 
Seyle, Morales, & Swann, 2005).  This work proves that self-verification motives include 
the entirety of the self concept, and also that social identities are relevant to self-
verification motives.  This extension of self-verification theory to collective levels of the 
self-concept provides an important and novel way of examining the interaction between 
the personal and social self, and gives new ways of looking at the psychology of extreme 
behaviors.  This is because research which shows that the social levels of self-definition 
are relevant to self-verification raises the interesting question of how motives acting at 
the level of the personal and the social self should interact.  If people desire verification 
for both their personal and their social self-views, then any given situation has the 
potential to speak to the verification needs at the personal level, at the social level, or at 
both levels.  An obvious prediction from this is that people will prefer situations which 
support as many types of self-verification as possible.  By preference, people should 
select and elect to remain in those situations where they can receive feedback that verifies 
both their personal and their social selves (Swann, Polzer, Seyle, & Ko, 2004; Seyle & 
Swann, 2005).
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In many situations, it may not be possible to receive verification for both personal 
and social self-views. Verification of the personal self-views means verifying the self-
view of the idiosyncratic elements that make up the self-concept.  Unless these elements 
overlap to a great degree with the group prototype (the expected characteristics of a 
typical group member), verification of the personal self-view means pointing out the 
ways in which a group member is different from the average member of the group. This 
type of focus on the individual characteristics distances the person from the group 
(Brewer, 1991), and is at odds with the kind of close alignment with the group prototype 
that research predicts is an important determinant of connection to the group (Hogg, 
Cooper-Shaw, & Holzworth, 1993; Hogg & Hardie, 1991), suggesting that in many cases 
receiving verification for the personal self-views will actually challenge the social self-
views by showing the way the person is not connected to the group.  
Note that this is not necessarily the case in all situations.  The desire for 
verification of the personal self-view and verification of the social self-views are only at 
odds when the personal self-views make the person stand out as distinct from the group.  
To the extent that a group member’s personal self-views are in line with what is expected 
from group members, this is not the case.  If the person’s self-views are, in fact, similar to 
what people expect from a member of their group, then seeking verification for their 
personal self-views need not individuate them and increase their distance from the group.  
In fact, to the degree to which an individual’s personal self-views contain attributes 
expected of the typical group member, efforts to receive verification for personal self-
views will serve to point out how similar this person is to the prototype of the group.  In 
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this case, verification for the personal self-views will actually serve to support the social 
self-views as well.  For example, a proud intellectual who joins a chess club will most 
likely be very pleased with information that confirms that he has the attributes of a 
typical chess player, as those attributes (intellectual ability, a certain lack of athletic 
skills) are already a part of his existing self-views.  On the other hand, an enthusiastic 
jock joining the same club will be less likely to seek out verification of his social self-
view as a member of the club even if he enjoys chess, as doing so may challenge his 
existing self-view as an athletic person. 
INTERACTIONS BETWEEN PERSONAL AND SOCIAL SELF-VIEWS
If people desire verification for both their personal and social self-views, and the 
degree of overlap between their personal self-view and the social prototype of the groups 
they belong to mediates their ability to receive verification for both levels of identity at 
the same time, then several predictions may be made from this.  First, it can be assumed 
that people will be most attracted and most committed to those groups which share social 
prototype in line with the way they see themselves.  Because social groups carry 
information about the individuals who join them, and can be seen as one of the identity 
cues that people consciously and unconsciously create to display the way they see 
themselves (e.g. Gosling, Ko, Mannarelli & Morris, 2002).  Because a greater degree of 
overlap between their personal self-views and the social prototype of the group means 
that a greater proportion of the personal self-views can be verified without challenging 
the social self-view, the more the overlap, the more attractive that group will be.  
Moreover, this greater overlap means that feedback that confirms the personal self-views 
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will serve to point out how much like the group a person is, while feedback that reassures 
that person about their group membership will affirm that they have the characteristics 
expected of group members and in doing so support their personal self-views.  Because 
of this, personal and social self-verification motives will be working in tandem to tie 
people to these groups (Swann, Polzer, Seyle, & Ko, 2004).  
This prediction is similar to predictions made by self-categorization theory 
(Turner, 1985), which argues that the degree of overlap between the personal self-view 
and the social prototype of the group determines the extent to which someone will be a 
valued member of a group (e.g. Hogg & Hardie, 1991, 1992; Hogg, Cooper-Shaw, & 
Holzworth, 1993).  However, self-categorization theory argues that this is the result of a 
natural cognitive process occurring in groups that has nothing to do with the personal 
self-view, as interacting in these group settings leads to an activation of the social 
prototype and a shift away from the personal self.  In this viewpoint, the overlap between 
personal and social self-view has more to do with the success or failure of the 
categorization process than any motivation acting at the level of the personal self.  
Theories based in self-verification motivations expand this hypothesis by pointing out the 
ways that such personal motivations may actually support the selection of groups, and 
help or hinder any purely cognitive categorization processes that do exist.
The second prediction that can be made from the interaction between verification 
motives at the personal and social level is that people will be most satisfied with feedback 
that provides a balance of verification of personal and social self-views, rather than 
focusing on one alone.  Research into optimal distinctiveness theory (Brewer, 1991) 
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supports the prediction that most people will prefer balanced feedback that supports both 
elements of their personal and social self-views.  Optimal distinctiveness theory argues 
that people have competing needs for individuality and affiliation with groups, and that 
these needs are in a process of constant negotiation.  When the equilibrium between these 
two needs is breached by feedback that emphasizes either similarity with or 
differentiation from the social prototype, people move to restore this balance by either 
emphasizing their unique characteristics or their similarity with the group (Hornsey & 
Hogg, 1999; Pickett & Brewer, 2001).  From a self-verification perspective, these results 
are unsurprising, as any feedback which stresses how similar an individual is to a group 
that they belong to must necessarily be challenging to the personal self-view, unless that 
group is perfectly aligned with the personal self-view.  Similarly, any feedback which 
verifies any personal self-view which is distinct from that which is expected from the 
group member must appear as threatening to their social identity.  The result is that, in 
addition to the drives for affiliation and distinctiveness hypothesized by Brewer, self-
verification motives will act in most situations to reinforce a desire to be seen as similar, 
but not completely like, the social groups which people belong to.
This second prediction has an important corollary, though.  While optimal 
distinctiveness theory argues that people will always seek to be distinct from the group to 
some degree, self-verification theory predicts that people will only seek to be distinct 
from the group to the extent that their existing personal self-view is different from the 
social prototype of the group.  If someone discovered a group that had a social prototype 
which completely overlapped with the way they saw themselves, self-verification 
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motivations would predict that that person would seek to align themselves completely 
with that group.  If they were successful in joining that group, then motivations for both 
personal and social verification could be satisfied at the same time.  In that case, these 
groups would become extremely attractive to the group members (Swann, Polzer, Seyle, 
& Ko 2004).
Taken as a whole, self-verification motives suggest that people seek groups which 
have a social prototype in line with the way they see themselves.  The greater the degree 
of overlap between the personal and social identity, the greater the attraction to the group.  
The most verifying group, it can be seen, is one in which there is a complete overlap 
between the personal and the social self-views.  Such groups may be extremely powerful 
in the psychology of the group members, and it is in this kind of overlap that a 
psychological explanation of extremism may be found. As will be seen, when this kind of 
overlap is coupled with a strong need for verification, the result may be extremism.
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Chapter 4: Identity Fusion: Definition and Predictions
Self-verification theory therefore proposes that the degree of overlap between the 
personal self-views and the social stereotype of a particular group is an extremely 
important predictor of the attraction and importance of a given group to its members or 
prospective members.  In the most extreme form of this overlap, a group member may 
see their self-identity as overlapping completely with the social prototype of a group that 
they belong to.  That is, whether because their identity is shaped to be so, or because they 
found a group which they fit perfectly, the group member may see their personal self-
view as containing all those attributes which are expected from a group member and only 
those attributes.  The overlap between the way they see the social prototype of the group 
they belong to and their personal self-views is total.  In this case, there is little to 
distinguish between the personal self-views, or those attributes which describe the person 
as an individual, and the social self-views, or those aspects that tie the person to a group.  
Both contain the same set of attributes.  This state is termed identity fusion, as it can be 
considered a state in which the distinction between the personal, individual identity and 
the group becomes difficult to identify.  If the personal self-view overlaps completely 
with the social self-view, then activating one without making the other salient may be 
impossible.  The result is that, for all intents and purposes, the way that the individual 
sees him or herself is always filtered through the social self-view.  To such a person, the 
question “who are you” has only one real answer: a member of the group, with the 
characteristics associated with such group membership.  
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This dissertation proposes that this state, the state of identity fusion, may 
contribute to the phenomenon of group extremism.  Through a radical alignment with the 
group, so that the group member sees his personal self-views as being completely in line 
with the group membership, the group can become a dominant part of the self-view.  The 
results that may be predicted from this fit quite neatly with the existing research on the 
elements of extremism, supporting the idea that extremism may have fusion as an 
important component and providing theoretical answers to some existing holes in the 
theory of extremism.
IDENTITY FUSION AND EXTREMISM: THEORETICAL LINKS
The identity fusion model provides a theoretical underpinning to explain the three 
defining elements of extremism: belief that the group is morally right, belief that the 
group is absolutely correct, and belief that the group is opposed by active outgroups.  In 
the first case, the belief that the group is endowed with moral authority can be explained 
as an outgrowth of the fusing of personal and social identities.  Research suggests that for 
most, if not all people, the conception of the self as a moral person (in the sense that the 
individual understands and engages in “right” behavior in the world) is an important part 
of the self-identity (Hart, Atkins, & Ford, 1998; Möller & Savyon, 2003; Lewis, 2003; 
Aquino & Reed, 2002).  Even people who have engaged in violent or criminal actions 
often construct a narrative about their behavior that either explains it as a brief deviation 
from an otherwise moral life, or justifies the behavior in moral terms (Presser, 2004).  As 
a result, when the group becomes a significant element of the self-definition, there will be 
a strong desire to see the group as morally correct in its teachings.  If the group member 
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desires to see themselves as moral, and sees the group as being a primary element of who 
they are, then they will be strongly motivated to see the group as moral.  
In the second defining characteristic of extremism, the tendency to see the group 
as absolutely correct, verification motives are implicated.  Most groups have a set of 
shared beliefs, practices, or norms that identify them as a group and define them as a 
collective (Horne, 2001).  One of the things that membership in these groups means is the 
adoption of these beliefs or norms.  For a fused person, any variation in these norms or 
deviation from the expected behavior could be construed as a challenge to the social self.  
Because belonging to the group means believing or behaving in a particular way, then 
any behavior or belief that is not in line with these expected elements is something which 
distinguishes the person from the group.  This, in turn, is a threat to the existing self-
view.  For most people, some deviation from the social prototype is perfectly acceptable, 
as most people are engaged in the balancing act between the personal and the social self-
view.  For a fused person, however, this would be a threat to their existing self-views, and 
because of verification motives would be unwelcome feedback.  The result is that fused 
people will adopt the entire catalogue of behaviors associated with the group, and will not 
wish to deviate from it in any way.  
The third defining element of extremism, the tendency to believe that the group is 
opposed by other groups, is an outgrowth of the interaction of the first two elements with 
other effects of identification with the group.  People who are highly identified with a 
group draw a strong distinction between the ingroup and the outgroup (Tajfel, 1982; 
Mummendy & Schreiber, 1983).  When this is coupled with the absolutist elements of 
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extremism (that mean that any deviation from the teaching of the groups is enough to 
mark a group as an outgroup) and the moral elements (that make outgroups at best 
questionably moral groups), this means that the fused person sees the world as populated 
by immoral outgroups.  Given that the behavior of such outgroups tends to be ascribed to 
negative or malevolent motives (Brewer, 1999), the result is that any attempt to support 
any agenda other than that advanced by the ingroup may be seen as an actual attack on 
the ingroup.
The identity fusion perspective, then, provides a single theoretical viewpoint 
which may adequately explain the psychological underpinnings of the elements of 
extremism.  This is an important first step in establishing the relationship between 
extremism and identity fusion.  Fusion does not predict anything at odds with the 
observed elements of extremism, and in fact provides a theoretical explanation that ties 
these existing elements together into one related construct.  Additional evidence for the 
relationship between fusion and extremism comes in the fact that identity fusion 
addresses gaps in the existing theoretical explanations of extremism.
GAPS IN THE EXISTING LITERATURE
The review of current theories of extremism demonstrated that, while identity is 
clearly implicated in the psychology of extremism, existing theories of self and social 
identity are not effective at explaining extremism.  Social identity theory and self-
categorization theory, the two primary theories in this domain, fail to provide a 
motivational argument which successfully fits with observed effects.  Self-enhancement, 
the master motive of social identity theory, cannot explain the way that people develop 
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extremist attitudes towards low-status groups.  The identity fusion approach resolves this 
issue by seating the development of extremism primarily in the need for self-verification.  
While many people, having positive self-views, would prefer to align themselves with 
groups that are positive, verification theory would predict that all that is really necessary 
is that the group provides an overlap with the way that the people see themselves already.  
In this way, extremist groups associated with low-status groups are quite understandable, 
if these groups provide a way for people to reaffirm specific elements of their self-
concept.
The second gap in the existing literature has to do with the second hypothesized 
motivation, uncertainty reduction.  Uncertainty reduction, as it is described in the 
literature today, does not provide a theoretical explanation why any specific group will be 
more attractive or useful in the reduction of uncertainty than another.  A theory of 
identity fusion rooted in self-verification addresses this gap by providing specific 
predictions for which groups will be desired in conditions of uncertainty.  Only those 
groups which provide a way to reaffirm the existing self-view will be attractive to the 
uncertain individual. This prediction is supported by research showing that self-group 
overlap is an important predictor of attrition in the first year following joining the 
military, a situation in which there is both uncertainty and a very salient social group 
(Mael & Ashforth, 1995).  While traditional theories of uncertainty reduction cannot 
explain this fact, verification and identity fusion provide a theoretical explanation that 
may fit with the existing data. 
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In general, current theories of the social identity elements of extremism focus 
primarily on a limited set of human social motives, and as a result are unable to explain 
the entirety of the psychology of extremism.  Verification motives in general, and the 
concept of identity fusion in particular, provide an important counterpoint to existing 
theories.  The fact that identity fusion provides a way to address these gaps in existing 
theories strongly suggests that fusion may be a part of the extremist mindset.
IDENTITY FUSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF EXTREMISM
Any theory which sets out to explain the psychology of extremism should also 
attempt to develop a model that describes the development of the extremist mindset as 
well.  Identity fusion, based in self-verification, suggests that there are three primary 
ways that the radical self-group overlap that defines fusion can occur: the individual may 
discover a group whose social prototype completely overlaps the existing self-views, the 
social prototype can change so that overlap occurs, or the personal self-views can change 
so that overlap occurs.  Research in extremism supports the prediction that there are 
relationships between the ways that verification motives would predict fusion could come 
about and the way that extremists develop alignments with the groups they belong to
Pathways to identity fusion
The first way in which a group member may develop a fused identity is that the 
individual may have a fully constructed personal identity which includes a set of 
important, certain, and central self-views that happen to overlap with the social prototype 
of an existing group.  This is unlikely, however, as it is doubtful that most people will 
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have a personal self-concept in which all those elements of the self-view that are most 
important overlap completely with an existing group.  Most people’s self-concepts are 
complex and multifaceted, with a variety of (occasionally contradictory) self-views 
(Linville, 1985; 1987; Woolfolk, Gara, Allen, & Beaver, 2004), and it is highly 
improbable that random chance will lead to someone developing a set of self-views 
which significantly overlap the social prototype of a group.
The second way that fusion may develop is if a member of a group shapes the 
collective identity of the group they belong to in order to make it a reflection of their 
personal self-views.  Those people in a position to affect the social prototype of a group 
by determining who joins the group or by changing the public image of the group may 
change the group to be more in line with how they see themselves.  Research shows that 
it is possible to change the social prototype of a group (Sherman, 1996), so this pathway 
is a possibility.  However, this option is not open to most members of a group, as they are 
not likely to have enough influence in the way that the group is seen publicly to affect the 
social prototype of the group.
The third way that people may become aligned with a group to the point of fusion 
is if the individual shifts his personal self-view to be in line with the group.  This shift in 
identity is a common sight in many groups characterized by high commitment to the 
group.  Many groups that are marked by the kind of total alignment with the group that 
may characterize identity fusion, such as the military, are characterized by a period of 
induction or hazing in which the new members of the group are exposed to physical or 
emotional stressors, lack of sleep, or other pressures designed to shock their system and 
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challenge their existing personal identities, then rebuild the identity around the idealized 
view of the group (Dornbusch, 1955; Linhares de Albuquerque & Paes-Machado, 2004).  
The result is that successful recruits come out of the initiation process very closely 
aligned with the group and its social prototype, with a new set of personal self-views that 
incorporates the desired qualities of the group members.  A recent chapter (Postmes, 
Baray, Haslam, Morton, & Swaab, 2005) argued that a similar effect is found in groups 
whose ideology or culture places that group in the position of commenting on or 
completely controlling all the elements of a member’s behavior, such as many 
fundamentalist religious groups.  In such a case, the continual salience of the group exerts 
a strong pressure on the member to change their personal self-views to be brought into 
line with the social prototype.
At its surface, this form of challenge and rebuilding of the personal and social 
self-views may appear to conflict with the research on verification motives, in that it 
shows that identity is amenable to manipulation by the situation.  When these phenomena 
are examined in more detail, however, it becomes clear that this research is not a 
challenge to the theory of self-verification.  In fact, verification motives may be a central 
part of the effectiveness of this reconstruction of the self-identity.  Self-verification 
argues that those aspects of the self-view that are most certain are the primary focus of 
verification motivations (Swann & Ely, 1984).  In self-views that are less certain, 
verification motives are less strong, and can be overridden by other situational motives 
such as a desire to be seen as having whatever attributes are most useful for a particular 
situation (Bosson & Swann, 2001).  This means that some aspects of the self may be 
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malleable and more open to adaptation to the situation, while those core elements of the 
self-description, and those aspects of the self-view that the individual is most certain 
about, are not.
Applying this to groups which include a strong attempt to change the self-identity 
gives us a theoretical lens to look at how the process of identity change may come about.  
The aspects of hazing and initiation rituals which challenge the identity of the new 
inductees, such as physical and emotional pressures that emphasize the fact that their new 
environment is radically different from the one they have left or a strong restriction in 
their abilities to display their personal identities through channels such as dress or haircut 
(which have been shown to be an important element of displays of personal identity - see 
Pratt & Rafeli, 1997) serve to provide a strong challenge to the individual’s existing self-
views.  The inductee is told that his self-views are incorrect, and prevented from many 
behaviors normally used to reinforce the existing self-views, creating a strong challenge 
to the self.  At the same time that these verification needs are evoked, the group provides 
the new social identity as a way of providing self-verification, in that it reassures the 
inductees that to belong to the group is to have a particular set of relevant attributes.  To
the extent that the presented attributes are in line with the challenged self-views, the 
group should be seen as very attractive and the new group members should 
enthusiastically adopt the new social identity.  As a part of this adoption, elements of the 
self-identity which are not certain or are not important may change to be brought into line 
with the attributes expected from the new social identity.  
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The utility of this process for meeting self-verification needs is only true if the 
social identity provides a channel for verification of more central and certain self-views.  
If the group’s social prototype includes an expectation that group members have 
attributes that are very distinct from the way in which the new recruit sees him or herself, 
then the social group will not be a very effective source of self-verification, and it is 
unlikely that new group members would be motivated to stay very long with the group or 
align themselves with the new social identity.  An example of this can be seen in the case 
of a new recruit who has joined the navy.  The navy includes an expectation of its seamen 
that they be tough, bright, resourceful, and extremely organized.  During the period of 
induction in which the new recruit is exposed to pressures that challenge her self-view, if 
that recruit has a highly central and certain view of herself as a tough, bright, and 
resourceful person, but an uncertain view of herself as disorganized, the likely result is 
that she will align with the navy identity as a source of self-verification, and as a result 
adopt a perspective of herself as highly organized.  If, on the other hand, the recruit has a 
highly central and certain view of herself as disorganized and unresourceful, then the 
navy will be an unappealing social identity, and it is unlikely that she will be able to 
successfully adopt the new social identity she is presented with.  With no solid recourse 
for verification strivings, it is unlikely that the new recruit will greatly enjoy or commit 
strongly to the navy as a social identity.
Research on organizational selection and retention supports this prediction.  
People who elect to join US military academies and enlist in the armed services change in 
some elements of their self-views, but also report significantly more overlap between the 
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way they see themselves and the social identities of the armed forces than the general 
population do even before the initiation process (Stevens & Rosa, 1994; Bachman, 
Freedman-Doan, Segal, & O’Malley, 2000).  Moreover, a strong predictor of whether 
new recruits in the US army drop out early in their career is the extent to which the 
recruit endorsed, before he or she entered the army, attributes strongly associated with the 
army’s social identity.  Those people who before going through induction into the army 
see themselves as resourceful, athletic, and interdependent (all elements of the social 
prototype of the soldier as presented in induction) are much more likely to remain in the 
armed forces than people with other self-views (Mael & Ashforth, 1995).  So, even in the 
case of organizations such as the military, where the change in the identity from civilian 
to the military values and identity has long been considered an important element of 
identification with the group (Dornbusch, 1955), self-verification motives appear to be 
quite active.
Pathways to extremism
If identity fusion is related to the psychology of extremism, then the pathways to 
fusion should be evident in the development of extremist mindsets.  While it is possible 
that the first two paths to fusion are related to extremism, the relative rarity of the 
precursor situations for these to suggests that the greatest evidence should be found for 
the third path.  The most likely situation leading to fusion will be one in which an 
individual receives a challenge to their existing self-identity, then is offered a chance to 
join a social group which includes a social prototype offering verification for the existing 
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self-view.  If identity fusion is related to extremism, research on the development of 
extremism should show similar elements.
Research on recruitment into extremist groups shows that something very similar 
is often observed in an individual’s decision to join extremist groups.  One of the most 
common descriptions of people motivated to join extremist groups such as white power 
groups or religious cults is an insecure or uncertain sense of who they are (Turpin-
Petrosino, 2002; Curtis & Curtis, 1993).  These people are entranced by groups that 
affirm particular beliefs about themselves that they may not have had strong support for 
previously, such as a belief that they are strong or important individuals (Ezekiel, 1995; 
2002).  One researcher has suggested that the political or general goal of the group is 
unimportant, and that as long as the group provides an outlet that supports the 
individuals’ needs for social interaction and membership in a group that sustains the way 
they would like to be seen, the potential extremist may just as happily join a radical 
environmental or animal rights group as a racist organization (Ezekiel, 2002).  This is 
only true, of course, to the extent that the beliefs or social identity of the new group does 
not threaten the existing identity.  Writing about the development of cults and totalist 
religious movements, Hardin & Kehrer (1982) argued that the most important element 
that would cause a new member to reject the group was the degree to which “the 
individual views his identity as being jeopardized by the new belief system” (pg 268). 
In self-verification terms, people who are not receiving sufficient verification 
from their social groups or surroundings are attracted to those groups which affirm the 
way they see themselves, and offer new ways of supporting their self-views.  If the 
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specific beliefs and social identity of the group they join are not excessively removed 
from their existing self-views, then they will quickly adopt those beliefs and behaviors as 
a way of identifying more closely with the group.  While the lack of verification and 
social connection studied is often chronic, there is evidence to suggest that it may be 
situational, as well.  The personal histories of many of the September 11th hijackers 
follow path that demonstrates this: they were well-educated young men from well-off 
families in Morrocco, Yemen, and the United Arab Emirates who moved to Germany to 
study.  Most were religious, but not excessively so prior to this move.  While studying, 
they became homesick and lonely, and developed ties to an extremist mosque that 
preached a hard-line version of Islam.  This mosque provided affirmation of their self-
views as Muslims, social ties with other Muslims, and encouraged them to develop 
radical identification with the group.  From this affiliation with the Islamist cause, they 
moved on to officially join al Qaeda and the global jihad (Sageman, 2004).  
The movement away from home and the social networks it represents appears to 
have played an important role in the development of the extremist affiliation of the 9/11 
terrorists.  Germany represented a new world, in which they knew very few people.  
While it is certainly the case that this is stressful for other reasons than the challenge it 
brings to the self-identity, it is nevertheless likely that this move was a strong shock to 
their existing self-views.  Without an existing social network to provide verifying 
feedback, or the familiar cues of self-identity that allowed the affirmation of the self-view 
as a Muslim, or a Moroccan, or other self-views, the future hijackers were in much the 
same boat as a new recruit to the military, cast into a strange world that was dramatically 
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different from their usual context.  And like new recruits to the military, when they were 
offered a chance to join a social group that contained affirmations of their existing self-
views, they quickly adopted that social identity as a central part of who they were.
This role of identification with a group, coupled with uncertainty, is a prevailing 
strain in research on the development of extremist mindsets.  Research on terrorist groups 
in general stresses the importance of the existing self-views in creating the attraction of a 
specific group for a potential recruit, whether that is an existing affiliation with a group 
that is focused on as a moral and righteous affiliation (White, 2001), or a personal self-
view of religiosity or adventurousness that drives a recruit towards a group associated 
with these self-views (Post, 2005).  The identity fusion formulation and its root 
motivation of self-verification, provides a theoretical explanation for why this may be, 
and suggests a clear prediction about what would make one member of any given group 
more attracted to an extremist identification with the group than another.  To the extent to 
which a self-view is certain, and that self-view is represented in a particular group, then 
that group will be attractive when the individual’s self-view is threatened.  If there is a 
great deal of overlap, or the individual does not have a large set of certain, stable self-
views, then the person may fuse with the group.  From this position, he or she will be 
predisposed towards an extremist mindset towards the group.  If the group itself 
encourages this mindset (through a deliberate adoption of moral authority or a norm of 
absolute alignment with the group), as most extremist groups do, then this predisposition 
is even more likely to result in a fused identity.  
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Empirical research in identity fusion and extremism
Identity fusion is a new and developing construct.  Existing research in identity 
fusion has focused on developing and validating a scale to assess fusion and associating 
this scale with strongly pro-group behavior.  This work has demonstrated that a measure 
of identity fusion adapted from Aron’s work on graphical measurement of the inclusion 
of close others in the self-concept (e.g. Aron, Aron, Tudor, & Nelson, 1991) is an 
effective predictor of strongly pro-group behavior both in the US (Seyle & Swann, 2005) 
and in Spain (Swann, Seyle, Gomez, Morales, & Huici, 2007).  This scale is shown in 
Figure 4.1.  Participants identified as fused (defined as a response of “E” on the identity 
fusion questionnaire in Swann et al.  2007 and “D” or “E” in Seyle & Swann 2005 –see 
Appendix A) report significantly more willingness to sacrifice and fight for the group.  
Moreover, when fused participants have their verification needs evoked by feedback 
targeting the personal self, these effects increase, suggesting that there is a connection 
between the personal self and the social self in fused participants. Additional tests of the 
identity fusion scale have found that it effectively predicts responses to measures of 
religious fundamentalism even when controlling for behavioral religiosity (Seyle & 
Swann, 2005).  Collectively, this research supports the argument that identity fusion as 
measured by the identity fusion scale is an effective predictor of pro-group behavior.  
This provides some support for the proposal that identity fusion may be an effective 
model for the psychology of extremism.
Figure 4.1: Identity fusion scale (Swann, Seyle, Gomez, Morales, & Huici, 2007)
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CURRENT RESEARCH
Taken as a whole, identity fusion offers a perspective which fills an important gap 
in the psychology of extremism.  Predictions from the identity fusion formulation about 
the description and development of the fused identity provide an explanation for the 
defining characteristics of extremist beliefs and accurately describe the observed 
phenomena of induction into extremist groups or extremist ideologies.  Identity fusion 
provides a theory that addresses existing gaps in the literature, in that it provides a 
motivational explanation that predicts when and in what circumstances people will be 
attracted to extremist beliefs.  Furthermore, identity fusion provides a theoretical 
explanation for the characteristics of extremism that make the extremist mindset such a 
powerful phenomenon.  In all, it is very likely that identity fusion can provide an 
important window into the psychology of extremists.  The remainder of this dissertation 
focuses on empirical tests of the overall hypothesis that identity fusion underlies the 
psychology of extremism.  
Three studies were conducted which examined the existence of a fusion-
extremism link, the motivational underpinnings of fusion, and the cognitive consequences 
of fusion with a group.  This set of studies was designed to make three main points.  First, 
that the development of fusion is related to a need for self-verification, and is distinct 
from the development of identification with the group.  Second, that the kind of strong 
reaction to ideas opposing the group that characterizes extremism is related to identity 
fusion with a group.  Third, that identity fusion is related to the kind of real-world 
extremist behaviors most likely to be seen in day-to-day life.  These data collectively 
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explored the utility of identity fusion for explaining the psychology of extremism and the 
relationship between establish self-verification motives and the development of identity 
fusion.
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Chapter 5: Study 1
Self-verification theory predicts that people will always prefer to belong to or 
identify with groups that have a social prototype in line with their own existing personal 
self-views.  These groups are attractive because they directly provide verification for the 
personal self-views through membership in the group, as well as because they let group 
members interact with like-minded others.  However, a strong overlap between the 
personal self-views and the social identity of the group may not in and of itself be 
sufficient for fusion.  Research examining the process of radicalization that new recruits 
of extremist groups go through suggests that the development of powerful group 
alignment is a fairly extended process, not relatively quick as would be expected if mere 
overlap were enough to engage fusion (Sageman, 2004).  One prediction, arising from 
research in self-verification theory, is that only if a person has a particular need for self-
verification caused by either a situational or chronic lack of verifying interactions will 
they motivated to align with the group to the point of fusion and even then only if that 
group provides a strongly verifying social self-view.
This study tested the prediction that fusion with a group would be most likely to 
occur when verification needs were activated and participants were placed in a situation 
which made some social group salient.  Unlike earlier theories of social identity, it was 
predicted that this salient social group would only be attractive if it gave participants the 
opportunity for self-verification (by fitting with existing self-views).  Political affiliation 
was used to test this general prediction.  The design was a 2(challenged vs. verified self-
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views) x 2(group sharing vs. opposing existing self-views) experimental design in which 
participants were exposed to information which either confirmed or challenged their 
perceptions of themselves as individuals then given the chance to interact with an online 
group that either fit with or did not fit with existing political self-views.  
There were two specific predictions made in this study. The first relates to the 
interaction between identification with the group and self-verification motives in general.  
Because social groups are one way that people can establish support for their existing 
self-views, social groups that support people’s existing self-views should be more 
attractive than those that do not.  Regardless of whether their self-views were challenged 
or verified, participants should always prefer social groups that are verifying and more 
quickly identify with that group.  Thus, the first prediction was:
1. Participants will, regardless of challenges to their self-views, display a 
stronger preference for interacting with and more enjoyment of the online 
discussion group when placed in a group that is verifying to their self-view 
than those participants placed in a non-verifying group
The second prediction relates to the interaction between challenged self-views and 
identity fusion.  If fusion is the result of verification needs, then participants who have 
these needs evoked by laboratory manipulations should show a greater chance of 
becoming fused with a salient group.  This prediction should only be true if this group
offers a chance to support their existing self-views, however.  If the group does not 
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support existing self-views, then there should be no such attraction, and hence no such 
fusion.  The specific prediction was:
2. Participants whose self-views have been challenged will be more likely to 
display fusion and identification with their political affiliation when placed in 
a discussion group which shares that affiliation, compared to participants 
whose self-views have been confirmed and those placed in discussion groups 
opposed to their affiliation.
Finally, the third prediction relates to the effects of self-certainty.  Verification 
needs are strongest when the self-views challenged are self-views held with more 
certainty (Swann & Ely, 1984).  People may be willing to forego verification of self-
views they are unsure about, but when beliefs that are highly certain are challenged, 
people are particularly likely to seek out verification.  Because of this, participants who 
are more certain about their self-views should show a stronger reaction to manipulations 
which evoke verification needs.  If fusion is an outgrowth of verification needs, then 
participants who are more certain about their self-views should show the most fusion in 
response to activated verification needs.  This prediction is:
3. Certainty will significantly mediate the relationship between verification 
needs and fusion such that people higher in self-certainty will show a greater 
likelihood of fusion with a group than people low in self-certainty when 
verification needs are activated and they are placed in discussion groups that 




Participants were recruited online through either a listing of undergraduate 
research studies or messages calling for volunteers posted on community volunteering 
and psychological research websites.  Undergraduate participants received class credit, 
while non-student participants were entered into a drawing for a gift certificate.  Only 
American citizens were included in the sample.  Three hundred and fifty-four participants 
completed the study and allowed us to use their data, including 270 from the 
undergraduate subject pool (198 F, 70 M, 2 no information; mean age = 18.81, SD = 
1.59, median age = 18) and 63 from the Internet (45 F, 18 M; mean age = 31.56, SD = 
11.12, median age = 28).
Materials and Procedure 
 Interested respondents were directed to a website that presented the research as 
an examination of how people see the political groups they belong to and how people
behave in online discussion.  Those participants agreeing to participate were randomly 
assigned to a feedback condition (verifying or challenging) and a discussion group 
condition (sharing existing affiliation or opposed to existing affiliation).  Participants then 
completed demographic measures including age, gender, citizenship, and a measure of 
political affiliation (on a scale ranging from 1 “completely conservative” to 8 
“completely liberal”).  Participants also completed the Self Attributes Questionnaire 
(Pelham & Swann, 1989), as well as a measure of the certainty of self-views (for each of 
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the items used in the SAQ, participants were asked to rate the certainty of their answer on 
a scale from 1 “not at all certain” to 10 “completely certain”).
Next, participants were introduced to the topic of the conversation, which was 
presented as a discussion of the performance of President Bush and asked to write a short 
paragraph describing themselves as an introduction to the other participants.  Participants 
were told not to overtly identify their political affiliation in this introductory paragraph.  
After completing this introduction, participants were asked to read paragraphs ostensibly 
written by four other participants, and to rate each on the SAQ items.  They were 
informed that while they were rating other participants, another participant would be
rating them.
Following completion of their ratings, participants were presented with the 
verification manipulation.  This was presented as feedback ostensibly given by another 
rater on how that person perceived the participant.  The feedback was actually generated 
automatically based on the participant’s experimental condition.  In the confirmed self-
view condition, SAQ ratings were based off of the individual’s responses, with one point 
added to the ratings of intelligence, creativity, anger, and intolerance.  In the challenged 
self-view condition, SAQ ratings were based on the participant’s response, but with three 
points subtracted from the ratings of creativity and intolerance, and two points added to 
the ratings of intelligence, hardworkingness, submissiveness, and anger.  
In the next stage of the study, participants were presented with the discussion 
group manipulation.  This was presented as a bulletin board with several comments on it 
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from various other participants.  These comments were generated so that each discussion 
group was strongly weighted towards one perspective, with one group being primarily 
conservative (including comments which were overall approving of the President’s 
administration, with some dissenters and traditionally conservative positions given as 
reasoning for both approving and dissenting opinions) and one group being primarily 
liberal (including comments that were overall opposed to the President’s administration 
with some dissenters, and traditionally liberal reasoning given for both positions).  See 
Appendix B for the comments.
Participants were assigned to a discussion group based on experimental condition.  
In the shared affiliation group condition, participants were assigned to a discussion group 
which mirrored their self-described political affiliation (identified by splitting the 
measure of affiliation such that responses of 1 through 4 were coded as liberal and 5
through 8 as conservative).  In the opposing condition, participants were assigned to the 
opposite group.  In each case, participants were asked to join into the discussion by 
writing a comment.  After finishing this, participants were directed to a page containing 
the dependent measures.  Degree of enjoyment of the discussion was assessed through 
three questions (“How much did you enjoy participating in this online discussion?”, “If 
you had a chance to participate in this online discussion with the same group of people 
outside of this experiment, would you be interested?”, and “If you had a chance to 
participate in an online discussion on a similar topic but a different group of people
outside this experiment would you be interested?”), each scored 1 to 9 with 9 indicating 
greatest agreement. Identification and fusion with both the group “conservative” and 
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“liberal” were assessed.  Identification was measured using the organizational 
identification questionnaire (Mael & Ashford, 1992), a five-question, validated 
measurement of identification with the group (sample items include items such as “I am 
very interested in what citizens of others countries think about my group” and “When 
someone praises my group, it feels like a personal compliment”).  This questionnaire is a 
well-established measure of identification.  Identity fusion was measured with the 
identity fusion scale (Swann, Seyle, Gomez, Morales, & Huici, 2007).
RESULTS 
Response to group discussion
Participants’ response to the items assessing enjoyment and willingness to 
continue the group discussion are shown in Figure 5.1.  To test the effects of the 
manipulations on participants’ response to the group discussion, a 2 (verification: verified 
or challenged) X 2 (discussion group: shared vs. opposed affiliations) MANOVA was 
performed with the three group discussion measures as the dependent variables.  This 
MANOVA found no overall effect for verification (F(3,346) = 1.843, n.s.), discussion 
group (F(3,346) = .546, n.s.), or interaction of verification by discussion group (F(3,346) 
= .194, n.s.).  However, the MANOVA tests of individual effects found that in the case of 
the question assessing enjoyment, there was a significant difference between verified and 
challenged participants (F(3,351) = 4.518, p<.05).  
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Fusion was assessed with the identity fusion scale.  Participants were defined as 
fused if they endorsed a response of “D” or “E” on the identity fusion scale (see 
Appendix A).  Participants completed the identity fusion scale for both the political 
affiliation “liberal” and “conservative” and answers were recoded to obtain a measure of 
fusion with the political affiliation matching the discussion group they were placed into.  
Of the 333 participants who responded to this question, 84 (24%) indicated fusion with 
the affiliation associated with their discussion group
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Because fusion was defined as a dichotomous state rather than a continuous 
variable, the relationship between fusion and the manipulations was tested by using 
binary logistic regressions.  Verification (dummy-coded with the verified group as 0 and 
the challenged group as 1), discussion group (dummy coded with the opposed group as 0 
and the shared group as 1), and the verification-by-discussion group interaction term 
were entered as predictors into a binary logistic regression with fusion with the affiliation 
matching the discussion group as the outcome measure.  This analysis found no 
significant effect for verification (β = -.095, SE = .831, odds ratio = .909, n.s) or the 
verification-by-discussion group interaction (β = .269, SE = .091, odds ratio = 1.308, n.s).  
However, in this analysis discussion group is a significant predictor of fusion such that 
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participants in shared affiliation discussion groups were more likely to indicate fusion 
with the group (β = 3.163, SE = .628, odds ratio = 23.636, p<.001).  
Following these analyses, the effects of certainty on fusion and the interaction of 
certainty with the manipulations was assessed.  The first analysis included a series of 
binary logistic regressions.  In step 1, verification (dummy-coded with the verified group 
as 0 and the challenged group as 1), discussion group (dummy coded with the opposed
group as 0 and the shared group as 1), and certainty (continuous) were entered as 
predictors of fusion.  In step 2, the verification-by-certainty interaction term, and the 
verification-by-discussion group interaction term were added as predictors.  In step 3, the 
three-way interaction term was added. These found a significant effect for discussion 
group such that people in the shared affiliation discussion group were more likely to be 
fused, but no other significant effect.  See Table 5.1
Table 5.1: Results for binary logistic regressions including certainty
Identification
Identification was assessed as the sum of responses to the organizational 
identification scale (mean = 12.38, SD = 5.31).  To test the relationship between the 
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
Predictor B S.E. OR p B S.E. OR p B S.E. OR p
Verification 0.101 0.299 1.106 n.s. -0.974 1.921 0.377 n.s. -4.302 4.672 0.014 n.s.
Discussion group 3.284 0.446 26.683 <.001 3.159 0.63 23.54 <.001 3.159 0.63 23.54 <.001
Certainty -0.01 0.015 0.993 n.s. -0.014 0.021 0.986 n.s. -0.014 0.021 0.986 n.s.
Certainty by 
verification
- - - - 0.014 0.03 1.014 n.s. 0.069 0.074 1.072 n.s.
Certainty by 
discussion 
- - - - 0.247 0.892 1.28 n.s. 3.894 4.697 49.113 n.s.
Three-way 
interaction
- - - - - - - - -0.061 0.074 0.941 n.s.
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manipulations and identification, a 2(verification: verified vs. challenged) x 2(discussion 
group: shared vs. opposed affiliations) ANOVA was performed.  This analysis found a 
significant difference related to discussion group such that people in the shared affiliation 
group showed more identification with the affiliation associated with that group (F(1, 
346) = 146, p<.001) but no significant difference due to verification (F(1, 346) = .579, 
n.s.) or interaction between verification and discussion group F(1, 346) = .216, n.s.).  See 
Figure 5.3.
To assess the relationship between the manipulations and self-certainty, a 
2(verification: verified vs. challenged) x 2(discussion group: shared vs. opposed 
affiliations) ANCOVA including certainty and the certainty by verification interaction 
term as covariates was conducted.  This ANCOVA found that the significant effect for 
discussion remained (F(1, 341) = 144.9, p<.001), but no other effect was significant.  
Verification (F(1, 341) = .322, n.s.), certainty (F(1, 341) = .199, n.s.), the verification by 
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discussion interaction (F(1, 341) = .429, n.s.), and the certainty by verification interaction 
(F(1, 341) = .232, n.s.) all failed to show significant effects.
DISCUSSION
This study was designed to test the relationship between verification and fusion, 
based on the argument that fusion with a group may be one way of meeting particularly 
pressing verification needs.  The overall expectation was that participants would be most 
likely to display fusion with a group when their need for verifying feedback was activated 
and they were in an environment which made specific existing social identities salient.
Specific Predictions
There were several specific predictions made in this study.  The results showed
little support for these predictions.
Prediction 1: 
1. Participants will, regardless of challenges to their self-views, display a 
stronger preference for interacting with and more enjoyment of the discussion 
group when placed in a group that is verifying to their self-view than those 
participants in non-verifying groups
One of the core predictions of this design was based on the argument that 
participants would enjoy and prefer to interact with discussion groups that fit with their 
existing political affiliation.  This prediction is reasonable, because the attraction of 
similarity in opinions is a fundamental part of human social interaction (e.g. McPherson, 
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Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001).  However, the data from this study do not support this 
prediction.  The multivariate analysis found no overall differences between the 
participants placed in shared affiliation discussion groups and the participants placed in 
opposed discussion groups.  There are several potential explanations for this disconnect 
between existing theory and the data found in this study.  It may be that participants in 
this study showed no strong preference to interact with others who shared their existing 
political opinions, that the items used to measure this preference were not sensitive 
enough, or that the specific manipulation used for intergroup discussion was not strong 
enough.  
The first explanation is unlikely: although some participants may not show a
strong preference for shared vs. opposed opinions (this may reflect a search for exposure 
to other opinions, or a desire to test their opinions against others), the preference for 
interaction with similar others is a strong and well-supported finding in social psychology 
(McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001; Hogg, Cooper-Shaw, & Holzworth, 1993).  
Because the preference for interaction with others who are similar to us is so strong and 
pervasive a part of human social behavior, it would be very surprising if the effect is 
wholly absent in the current study.   
The second explanation, that the preference exists but was not successfully 
measured, is more plausible.  The items used in Study 1 to assess response to the 
discussion were chosen primarily to meet the criteria for face validity and were not 
extensively validated.  However, it is not the case that these items failed entirely to 
identify significant differences within the sample.  Participants whose received feedback 
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that challenged their self-views reported enjoying the discussion significantly less.  
Because people prefer to receive verifying information rather than nonverifying 
information, this is probably a carryover from the verification manipulation (which 
occurred immediately before the discussion began).  While the predicted effects for 
preference for shared affiliation discussion groups did not arise, these measures did pick 
up on the effects of the verification manipulation.  Therefore, while the idea that the 
measures are not sensitive enough is plausible, there is evidence that this is not wholly 
true.    
The third explanation, that the specific manipulation used in this study may not 
have been strong enough to provoke strong responses, is the most likely of the three.  A 
common question in research on computer-mediated communication is whether online 
discussion can be as engaging, significant, and compelling as face-to-face conversation.  
Although there is good evidence that online discussion can be as impactful as face-to-
face discussion, this impact requires significant investment in the conversation from the 
members.  Actual engagement in online discussion tends to develop only when there is a 
significant back-and-forth discussion between participants, and particularly when the 
conversation is composed of the same participants engaging with each other over a long 
period of time (Seyle, 2000).  The online discussion utilized in this study probably did 
not elicit the level of investment required for participants to take the conversation 
seriously.  Participants only posted once, and did not engage in any kind of back and 
forth conversation.  This is an extremely minimal form of interaction, and may not have 
been significant enough to elicit the desired effects.  Therefore, the most likely 
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explanation for these findings is that participants simply did not care enough about the 
conversation to show a significant difference between talking with people who shared 
their political opinion and people who did not. This effect is likely strengthened by the 
fact that the majority of the participants were younger than 25, placing them in a 
generation which displays strikingly low levels of political interest and engagement 
(Zukin, Keeter, Andolina, Jenkins, & Delli Carpini, 2006).  These findings overall 
suggest that the study materials were not very impactful.  While this specific prediction 
was not a central element of the relationship between verification and fusion, these 
findings raise problems for the rest of this study because they suggest the participants 
were not engaged with the task and may therefore not strongly react to the study.
Prediction 2: 
2. Participants whose self-views have been challenged will be more likely to 
display fusion and identification with their political affiliation when placed in 
a discussion group which shares that affiliation, compared to participants 
whose self-views have been confirmed and those placed in discussion groups 
opposed to their affiliation.
This prediction is based on the argument that fusion is an outgrowth of need for 
verification interacting with the situational or enduring salience of specific social groups 
that can provide this verification.  The analyses did not support this prediction: 
verification needs had no significant main effect or interaction with discussion groups in 
any analysis, showing that the verification manipulation failed to lead to a significant 
difference in fusion or identification.
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One possible explanation for these results is related to measurement.  As 
discussed in Appendix A, defining fusion as responses of either “D” or “E” has the 
problem of increasing the variance of the fused group and obscuring the existence of 
effects that a stricter definition of fusion may uncover.  It may be significant that the 
mean differences for both percentage of people indicating fusion and identification with 
their discussion group show participants in the challenged condition endorsing the items 
more.  It is possible that a sample which included a larger number of participants and a 
stricter definition of fusion would show results that exist but are obscured by the 
definition of fusion used in this study.
A second explanation for the lack of findings is suggested by the analyses of 
enjoyment of the discussion.  As discussed above, it is apparent that participants were not 
particularly invested in this study, possibly because of the focus on political affiliations.  
The core argument connecting verification to fusion is that when people’s needs for self-
verification are activated, they are more likely to align and possibly fuse with groups that 
affirm their existing self-views as a source of verification.  If the participants in this study 
were not particularly committed to their political affiliation, it may not have been seen as 
a social identity that could provide verification.   This study may be more effective if it is 
replicated with groups that are particularly important to the participants in the sample 
even before the beginning of the experiment.   
This explanation is somewhat challenged by the effects found for discussion 
group.  The analyses found that participants placed in discussion groups sharing their 
existing self-views showed more fusion and identification with the affiliation after the 
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discussion.  This suggests that for at least some participants, political affiliation is a 
significant enough social identity for them to indicate fusion with the group.  Most likely 
this has little to do with the manipulation: because in the shared affiliation group 
condition the measure of affiliation associated with the discussion was also a measure of 
fusion or identification with the existing self-nominated affiliation, it’s likely that the 
results for shared affiliation groups simply show the baserate of identification and fusion.  
Without the predicted interaction between verification and discussion group condition, it 
is difficult to conclude that these effects are attributable to the manipulation instead of 
reflecting the baserates in the general population.  If there is an effect such that the 
discussion group increased fusion and identification, it is likely related in part to priming 
of social self-views and possibly in part to the phenomenon of group polarization (e.g. 
Isenberg, 1986).  Participants in the shared affiliation group were placed in an 
environment where the majority of participants shared their political views, a context that 
research suggests is likely to lead to increased endorsement of their political views.  
Of course, a third potential explanation for the lack of effects is that the 
underlying hypothesis that fusion is related to verification concerns is incorrect.  While 
there is growing evidence that verification is active at both the personal and social levels 
of the self-concept (Chen, Chen, & Shaw, 2004) and earlier studies have found an 
association between verification needs and fusion (Swann, Seyle, Gomez, Morales, & 
Huici, 2007), there is as of yet not enough research on this for the question to be settled.  
Research carefully exploring these questions is needed before the existence of a 
relationship between verification concerns and fusion can be established.
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Prediction 3: 
3. Certainty will significantly mediate the relationship between verification needs 
and fusion such that people higher in certainty will show a greater likelihood of 
fusion with a group than people low in self-certainty when verification needs are 
activated and they are placed in discussion groups that share their existing 
political affiliation.
Past research in self-verification theory has demonstrated that people are 
significantly more reactive to challenges to certain, central self-views than to challenges 
to uncertain self-views (Swann & Ely, 1984).  Because of this, if fusion is related to self-
verification needs, then certainty of self-views should interact significantly with the 
verification prediction to predict identity fusion.  Those people who are most certain and 
receive challenging feedback should be more likely than people less certain about their 
self-views to fuse with groups when they are placed in groups sharing their existing self-
views.  Specifically, it was predicted that verification should interact with both discussion 
group and certainty to predict fusion and identification with the group.  This prediction 
was not supported by these data: neither verification nor any interaction between 
verification and certainty was an effective predictor of fusion in these analyses.  
The lack of a relationship between certainty and verification needs in our data
provides additional problems for the predicted relationship between verification and 
fusion.  If verification were to be found to be associated with fusion, it should be found in 
those people with the highest self-certainty.  The fact that it is not underscores the failure 
of this design to find any association between verification concerns and fusion.  As 
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discussed above, the question of why this is remains an open question.  It is possible that 
political affiliation is not seen as a source of verifying information about the self for most 
participants, or also possible that fusion is more closely related to other social 
psychological phenomena than verification.  
General discussion
The primary conclusion that can be drawn from Study 1 is that the design of this 
study was not overwhelmingly effective.  Very few participants indicated fusion with 
their political affiliation, and participants did not report a great deal of enjoyment of the 
discussion or desire to repeat the experience.  Given that the majority of participants were 
younger than 25, this fits with existing research about the relative lack of political 
engagement in the younger generation.  By focusing on political groups, it is likely that 
this design reduced the overall impact of the manipulations presented and possibly 
obscured the effects we hoped to find. Because of these methodological limitations, no 
firm conclusions can be drawn from these results.  
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Chapter 6: Study 2
Recent research in decisionmaking has challenged the economic model of the 
purely rational thinker by arguing that humans often have “sacred values” which are not 
amenable to rational, calculative processing (Tetlock, 2003; McGraw & Tetlock, 2005).  
This “Sacred Values Protection Model” argues that for some people, there are some core 
values which are held to be inviolate and not open for negotiation.  These sacred values 
are argued to be functionally outside the traditional costs and benefits approach to 
rational decisionmaking, and research suggests that people do treat arguments associated 
with sacred values differently than those that do not activate these values.  Participants 
asked to make decisions which place sacred values in competition, consider 
counterfactuals which challenge sacred values, or otherwise engage these values through 
rational and dispassionate analysis tend to respond strongly by reporting significant 
difficulty in making these considerations, showing significant moral outrage at the 
measures, and engaging in extensive reaffirmation of their sacred values following the 
consideration (Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000)
This research has opened fascinating new questions, but has currently failed to 
address an important element of this idea: what makes a value a sacred value?  The 
research has demonstrated that many people do hold particular values to be outside of 
rational calculation, and that many of these are related to widespread cultural beliefs 
about, for example, the sanctity of human life (Tetlock et al.  2000, experiment 2).  
However, many others relate to things such as the religious group to which a person 
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belongs or specific political opinions, which are idiosyncratic personal traits not shared 
by the entire culture (Tetlock et al.  2000, experiments 1, 5).  Although existing research 
has established the existence of sacred values, the work so far has not addressed why 
some values may become sacred to one person but not another, or what leads people 
towards identifying specific values as sacred.
One clue as to what may underlie the psychology of sacred values is found in the 
comparison of sacred values to the psychology of extremism.  The observable correlates 
of sacred values appear very similar to the key characteristics of extremism: participants 
treat sacred values as absolute and report greater perceptions of people who disagree with 
these values as actually being inherently bad people (Tetlock et al.  2000).  It is possible 
that sacred values represent the cognitive element of extremism.  If it is the case that 
identity fusion is the underlying psychology of extremism, and sacred values are one 
expression of the state of extremism, then it follows that identity fusion may provide an 
explanation for the development of sacred values.  If an individual is fused with a 
particular group, or otherwise takes a specific value or belief to be an integral part of who 
he or she is, then any attempt to question that belief is not simply a cognitive exercise or 
a harmless game of counterfactuals.  Instead, it is actually a challenge to the self-view, 
and as such something that will cause strong rejection of the idea and attempts to reaffirm 
of the self-view.  Seen through this light, the rejection of counterattitudinal propositions 
and “moral cleansing” behaviors that reaffirm group membership found as a response to 
these propositions make sense: these are expressions of verification concerns.
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Study 2 sought to examine the relationship between identity fusion and sacred 
values associated with political affiliation.  The overall design was a 2(political vs. 
nonpolitical counterfactuals) x 2(fused vs. nonfused) x 2(political affiliation: liberal vs. 
conservative) experimental design.  There were two specific predictions in this study.  
The first relates to the findings of Tetlock et al.(2000), who found that people who 
strongly endorsed the perspective of their group (in that case, a religious organization) 
reacted to requests to consider counterfactuals that oppose the group’s perspective with a 
high degree of moral outrage and moral cleansing behavior.  Tetlock and colleagues 
argue that this demonstrates the existence of sacred values in these group members.  If 
identity fusion is related to the development of sacred values, then the identity fusion 
scale should be an effective predictor of this kind of strong reactivity.  Therefore, the first 
prediction was:
1. Identity fusion with a political affiliation will be a predictor of resistance to
counterfactuals in the form of greater reported difficulty in considering these 
counterfactuals and more moral outrage, moral cleansing, and stronger 
emotional reactions following the consideration of political counterfactuals
but not following the consideration of nonpolitical counterfactuals.
An important distinction between this research and Tetlock et al.’s study is that 
this research proposes that it is identity fusion, rather than general strength of belief or 
affiliation with a group, that is an important part of the development of sacred values.  In 
Tetlock et al.’s research, the authors predicted the development of sacred values from 
either membership in specific groups or (in the case of religiosity) measures which asked 
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people to indicate the strength of their belief or identification with their religious group 
(e.g. the religious belief measure from Martin & Westie, 1959).  In contrast, the identity 
fusion formulation argues that it is not so much how strongly an opinion is held or 
membership in a specific group that predicts the development of sacred values so much 
as it is the question of how the group member constructs the relationship between the 
group and the self.  Thus, one prediction of this study was that fusion, not identification 
specifically, would be an important predictor of resistance to counterfactuals.  
Specifically, it was predicted that
2. Fusion will be an effective predictor of resistance to counterfactuals even 
when controlling for identification.
METHOD
Participants
Participants were recruited from undergraduate introductory psychology courses 
at the University of Texas as well as from postings calling for volunteer research 
participants on community websites and websites listing online experiments.  
Undergraduate participants received class credit, while non-student participants were 
entered into a drawing for a gift certificate.  Only American citizens who indicated voting 
in 2004, voting in 2006 or (for those participants completing the study before November 
of 2006) intention to vote in 2006 were included in the analysis.  One hundred ninety-five 
eligible participants completed the study, including 184 from the undergraduate research 
pool (125F, 58M, 1 declined to answer; mean age=18.5, SD=2.32; median age = 18) and 
64
eleven from the general population of the Internet (8F, 3M; mean age=27.64, SD=9.82; 
median age = 28).
Materials and Procedure 
Participants were directed to a website which introduced this study as an 
experiment how people saw political groups and how views of political groups relate to 
decisionmaking.  After reading and initialing an informed consent page, participants were 
randomly assigned to a condition (political or nonpolitical counterfactuals), then 
completed a  series of demographic questions including age, gender, American 
citizenship, and political affiliation (including the items “extremely liberal/progressive, 
moderate liberal, moderate, moderate conservative, extremely conservative, libertarian, 
and other”).  Next, participants were given the identity fusion scale and organizational 
identification questionnaire (Mael & Ashford, 1992) for their self-identified political 
affiliation and then presented with a series of counterfactuals designed to present simple 
if-then statements in either political or nonpolitical framing.  In each case, the 
counterfactual presented an argument laid out as a simple if-then designed so that the 
consequent in the if-then statement followed logically from the antecedent.  In the 
political condition, counterfactuals were designed to be contrary to some stance
commonly associated with either American liberalism (including counterfactuals 
suggesting racial profiling be used, gun control laws be weakened, and supporting the 
preemptive use of force) or American conservativism (including counterfactuals
suggesting the government should raise taxes, support adoption in nontraditional families, 
and that the US not be seen as a moral nation).  See Appendix C for a complete list of the 
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counterfactuals and measures used in this study.  After each counterfactual, participants 
completed ratings of how easy it was to imagine that the counterfactual might be true and 
(leaving aside their personal feelings) how difficult it was to see the consequent of the 
counterfactual following the antecedent if the antecedent were true.  After the eight
counterfactuals, participants completed a series of measures assessing moral outrage 
taken from Tetlock et al. (2000) (including items which allowed participants to express 
their opinion of anyone who would advance these counterfactuals), emotional reaction to 
the counterfactuals (including anger, sorrow, disappointment, and hope), and items 
assessing moral cleansing (including items assessing participants’ intentions to vote, 
donate money to a political figure, volunteer to support a candidate, and run for office).
Note that the language used here to describe these constructs is taken directly from 
Tetlock et al.’s terminology.  
RESULTS
Fusion and identification measures
One hundred and ninety-one of the one hundred and ninety-five participants 
completed the measure of fusion.  When fusion is defined as a response of “D” or “E” on 
the identity fusion scale, there were 128 unfused participants and 66 fused.  Rates of 
fusion and identification across the political affiliations are shown in Table 6.1. 
Identification was computed as the sum of responses to the Organizational Identification 
Questionnaire (mean = 13.86, SD = 4.69).
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Table 6.1: Fusion and identification scores across political affiliations
Political affiliation N N (%) Fused Mean identification
Extremely liberal 8 7 (87.5%) 20.25
Moderate liberal 56 17 (30.4%) 14.05
Moderate 55 21 (38.2%) 11.86
Moderate conservative 63 15 (23.8%) 13.89
Extremely conservative 9 6 (66.7%) 18.11
Libertarian 3 0 (0) 12
Total 194 66 (33.8%) 13.86
Political affiliation 
Because the predictions of this study were based on the idea that fused 
participants will respond specifically to counterfactuals which run contrary to their 
political affiliation, it was necessary to create a measure of political affiliation.  Because 
the items were designed to target liberals and conservatives, self-described moderates and 
libertarians were excluded from the analysis and the remaining participants were 
dichotomized as either liberal or conservative by collapsing the extreme and moderate 
levels for each group.  With the moderates and libertarians excluded, the final number of 
participants included in the analysis was therefore 136.  
Resistance
The initial analyses examined the impact of fusion on resistance to the 
counterfactuals.  Resistance was assessed with two items, each scored 1 to 9 with 9 
indicating the most resistance.  The first asked how difficult it was to imagine that the 
counterfactual might be true, and the second asked participants their difficulty in 
imagining the consequent following the antecedent if the antecedent were proved to be 
true.  Answers to these two items were highly correlated (mean r = .48) so a final 
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measure of resistance was computed as the mean of the two answers for each 
counterfactual.  Finally, in order to assess participants’ response across the different 
political frames of the counterfactual these responses were collapsed into two overall 
measures: one for those items framed to be contrary to liberal positions and one for those 
items framed to be contrary to conservative positions.  This was done by calculating the 
mean response across all items framed in each way (items 2,4,6, and 8 for those items 
contrary to liberal perspectives and items 1,3, 5, and 7 for items contrary to conservative 
perspectives).  In the nonpolitical condition an overall measure of resistance was 
computed by calculating the mean of responses to all eight counterfactuals.  Because of 
an error in the data collection website, resistance data for counterfactual number 7 was 
not recorded and is not reported here.

















Table 6.2: ANOVA results for resistance to counterfactuals
Antiliberal counterfactuals Anticonservative counterfactuals Nonpolitical counterfactuals
Source SS df MS F p SS df MS F p SS df MS F p
Fusion 0.55 1 0.55 0.42 n.s. 0.01 1 0.01 0.01 n.s. 0.05 1 0.05 0.04 n.s.
Affiliation 3.46 1 3.46 2.64 n.s. 22.32 1 22.32 23.8 <.001 0.01 1 0.01 0.01 n.s.
Affiliation by 
fusion 4.20 1 4.20 3.21 0.078 11.95 1 11.95 12.8 <.001 0.08 1 0.08 0.07 n.s.
Error 87.80 67 1.31 61.83 66 0.94 65.00 57 1.14
Total 1749.52 71 1022.94 70 813.42 61
Table 6.3: ANCOVA results for resistance to counterfactuals
Antiliberal counterfactuals Anticonservative counterfactuals Nonpolitical counterfactuals
Source SS df MS F p SS df MS F p SS df MS F p
Identification 1.81 1 1.81 1.38 n.s. 1.60 1 1.60 1.72 n.s. 0.07 1 0.07 0.07 n.s.
Identification by 
affiliation 0.33 1 0.33 0.25 n.s. 2.22 1 2.22 2.38 n.s. 2.42 1 2.42 2.2 n.s.
Fusion 0.01 1 0.01 0.01 n.s. 0.00 1 0.00 0 n.s. 0.30 1 0.30 0.27 n.s.
Affiliation 1.05 1 1.05 0.8 n.s. 0.02 1 0.02 0.02 n.s. 2.32 1 2.32 2.11 n.s.
Affiliation by 
fusion 3.89 1 3.89 2.95 0.090 4.65 1 4.65 5 <.05 0.54 1 0.54 0.49 n.s.
Error 85.68 65 1.32 59.54 64 0.93 60.44 55 1.10
Total 1749.52 71 1022.94 70 813.42 61
Response to the resistance measures are shown in Figure 6.1. To test the 
relationship between fusion and resistance, 3 2 (fusion: fused vs. unfused) by 2 (political 
affiliation: liberal vs. conservative) ANOVAs were conducted including resistance to
antiliberal counterfactuals, anticonservative counterfactuals, and the nonpolitical 
counterfactuals in separate analyses.  Results for these ANOVAS are shown in Table 6.2.  
These analyses revealed a fusion by affiliation interaction that was significant in 
response to anticonservative counterfactuals and approached significance to antiliberal 
counterfactuals.  Participants fused with a political affiliation showed higher resistance 
to counterfactuals opposing that perspective and lower resistance to counterfactuals 
opposing the alternative perspective.  For anticonservative counterfactuals, there was an 
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overall main effect for affiliation as well such that conservatives showed more resistance.  
No effects were found for the nonpolitical counterfactuals.
To determine if fusion had an effect on resistance when identification was 
controlled for, these ANOVAs were followed by 3 2(fusion: fused vs. unfused) by 2 
(political affiliation: liberal vs. conservative) ANCOVAs with identification and the 
identification by affiliation interaction term (calculated by multiplying identification by 
affiliation with affiliation coded as liberals = 0 and conservatives = 1) entered as 
covariates.  Results are shown in Table 6.3.  When the identification covariates were 
included in the analysis, the results did not change significantly except that in the case of 
anticonservative counterfactuals affiliation was no longer an overall significant predictor.  
The fusion by affiliation interactions identified in the earlier ANOVA remain, although 
the formerly marginal effect for the antiliberal condition has moved further away from 
significance.
Moral Outrage 
Moral outrage was assessed as agreement on a scale of 1 to 9 with four items 
(“This person is likely to admire people who disagree with him or her,” “This person is 
likely to have contempt for people who disagree with him or her,” “This person displays 
a great understanding of American history,” and “I would seek out this person’s 
company”) with all items except item 1 reverse-scored.  A final score for moral outrage 
was computed by computing mean response to the four items following the reverse 
scoring for each of the eight counterfactuals.  As above, these were then collapsed into 
three separate measures for response to liberal, conservative, and nonpolitical
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counterfactuals by computing the mean for responses to each set of counterfactuals (in 
the political condition, counterfactuals 2, 4, 6,and 8 for the antiliberal counterfactuals and 
items 1, 3, 5, and 7 for the anticonservative counterfactuals.  In the nonpolitical 
condition, the mean was response to all eight counterfactuals).
The effect of fusion and affiliation on moral outrage in response to 
counterfactuals was tested with 3 2(fusion: fused vs. unfused) by 2(political affiliation: 
liberal vs. conservative) x 2(condition: political vs. nonpolitical counterfactuals) 
ANOVAs including outrage in response to antiliberal, anticonservative, and nonpolitical  
counterfactuals as dependent measures.  See Figure 6.2.  Results for the ANOVAs are 
found in Table 6.4.  
These analyses found a significant effect interaction between fusion and 
affiliation in the antiliberal condition such that fused liberals showed more outrage than
unfused, while fused conservatives showed less.  The main effect for affiliation was also 
significant, such that liberals showed more moral outrage.  In the anticonservative
counterfactuals, there was a main effect for affiliation such that conservatives showed 
more moral outrage, but no other effects.  No significant effects were found in the 
nonpolitical counterfactuals.  
To determine if these effects held when identification was controlled for, these 
ANOVAs were followed by 3 2(fusion: fused vs. unfused) by 2(political affiliation: 
liberal vs. conservative) ANCOVAs with identification and the identification by 
affiliation interaction term (calculated by multiplying identification by affiliation with 
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affiliation coded as liberals = 0 and conservatives = 1) entered as covariates.  Results for 
these analyses are shown in Table 6.5.  When the identification covariates were included,
the effects found in the earlier ANOVAs were no longer significant.  In both 
anticonservative and antiliberal counterfactuals, the effect for affiliation was no longer 
significant.  In response to antiliberal counterfactuals, there was a significant 
identification by affiliation interaction, and the existing fusion by affiliation interaction 
was no longer significant (although it approached significance).  No effects were found in 
the nonpolitical counterfactuals condition.
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Table 6.4: ANOVA results for moral outrage 
Antiliberal counterfactuals Anticonservative counterfactuals Nonpolitical counterfactuals
Source SS df MS F p SS df MS F p SS df MS F p
Fusion 0.03 1 0.03 0.029 n.s. 0.03 1 0.03 0.044 n.s. 0.12 1 0.12 0.464 n.s.
Affiliation 7.27 1 7.27 7.964 <.05 6.52 1 6.52 10.867 <.05 0.39 1 0.39 1.472 n.s.
Affiliation 
by fusion 11.37 1 11.37 12.468 <.001 0.26 1 0.26 0.437 n.s. 0.08 1 0.08 0.303 n.s.
Error 59.29 65 0.91 37.79 63 0.60 15.53 59 0.26
Total 2650.59 69 2187.99 67 1771.48 63
Table 6.5: ANCOVA results for moral outrage
Antiliberal counterfactuals Anticonservative counterfactuals Nonpolitical counterfactuals
Source SS df MS F p SS df MS F p SS df MS F p
Identification
0.03 1 0.03 0.039 n.s. 0.35 1 0.35 0.568 n.s. 0.02 1 0.02 0.073 n.s.
Identification by 
affiliation
3.61 1 3.61 4.306 p<.05 0.00 1 0.00 0.005 n.s. 0.02 1 0.02 0.064 n.s.
Fusion
0.69 1 0.69 0.829 n.s. 0.31 1 0.31 0.501 n.s. 0.11 1 0.11 0.389 n.s.
Affiliation
1.26 1 1.26 1.507 n.s. 0.55 1 0.55 0.9 n.s. 0.07 1 0.07 0.263 n.s.
Affiliation by 
fusion
2.97 1 2.97 3.541 0.064 0.18 1 0.18 0.296 n.s. 0.03 1 0.03 0.105 n.s.
Error
52.75 63 0.84 37.10 61 0.61 15.51 57 0.27
Total 2650.59 69 2187.99 67 1771.48 63
Moral cleansing
Moral cleansing was assessed through five items tracking participants’ 
willingness to act to support the group (including items such as “How likely are you to 
donate money to your political party” and “How likely are you to volunteer for a political 
party or candidate”) scored 1 to 9 with 9 indicating the greatest likelihood.  A final score 
for moral cleansing was computed by finding the mean response across these five items.  
See Figure 6.3.   
To test the effects of considering political counterfactuals on moral cleansing, a  
2(condition: political vs. nonpolitical condition) by 2 (fusion: fused vs. unfused) by 2 
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(political affiliation: liberal vs. conservative) ANOVA was conducted.  This analysis 
found a significant effect for fusion such that fused participants were more likely to 
endorse these items (F(1,125) = 3.631, p<.01).  As above, this analysis was followed by a
2(political vs. nonpolitical condition) by 2(fused vs. unfused) by 2(political affiliation) 
ANCOVA including identification, the identification by affiliation interaction term, and 
the identification by affiliation by condition interaction term (computed by multiplying 
the identification by affiliation interaction by condition, coded as nonpolitical = 0 and 
political counterfactuals = 1) as continuous covariates.  This analysis found a significant 
effect for identification (F(1,122) = 8.952, p<.001), but no other significant effect.  See 
Table 6.6.
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Table 6.6: ANCOVA results for moral cleansing
Source SS df MS F p
Identification 9.62 1 9.62 8.592 <.01
Identification by affiliation 0.77 1 0.77 0.689 n.s.
Identification by affiliation by 
condition 2.72 1 2.72 2.425 n.s.
Condition 2.97 1 2.97 2.649 n.s.
Affiliation 0.21 1 0.21 0.184 n.s.
Fusion 0.00 1 0.00 0 n.s.
Condition by affiliation 2.21 1 2.21 1.969 n.s.
Condition by fusion 1.35 1 1.35 1.202 n.s.
Affiliation by fusion 0.34 1 0.34 0.307 n.s.
Condition by affiliation by fusion 0.24 1 0.24 0.21 n.s.
Error 136.59 122 1.12
Total 2698.20 133
Emotional Reaction
After the moral outrage measures, participants were asked to complete ratings of 
their emotional reaction to the arguments presented, including the emotions of Anger, 
Sorrow, Disappointment, and Hope, scored 1 to 9 with 9 indicating strong agreement that 
they felt this emotion. As above, these were collapsed into scores for emotional response 
to antiliberal counterfactuals, anticonservative counterfactuals, and nonpolitical 
counterfactuals.  For each of these emotions, a 2(fusion: fused vs. unfused) by 2(political 
affiliation: liberal vs. conservative) ANOVA was performed for the antiliberal, 
anticonservative, and nonpolitical counterfactuals and followed by a 2(fusion: fused vs.
unfused) by 2(political affiliation: liberal vs. conservative) ANCOVA with identification, 
and the identification by affiliation interaction term, included as covariates.
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Results for the initial ANOVA analyses for anger are shown in Table 6.7.  In the 
antiliberal counterfactuals, there was a significant interaction between affiliation and 
fusion such that fused liberals showed more anger in response to these counterfactuals 
and fused conservatives showed less, compared to unfused participants.  In both 
antiliberal and anticonservative counterfactuals, there was a main effect for affiliation 
such that the targeted affiliation responded with more anger.  There was no effect found 
in the nonpolitical condition.    
ANCOVA results are shown in Table 6.8.  When identification covariates were 
included in the analyses, the affiliation by fusion interaction found in response to the 
antiliberal counterfactuals remained significant.  In the anticonservative condition, the 
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inclusion of the identification covariates actually lead to the fusion by affiliation 
interaction becoming significant.  In this analysis, identification and the identification by 
affiliation interaction are significant covariates of anger in response to the 
anticonservative counterfactuals.  No effects were found in the nonpolitical condition. 
Table 6.7: ANOVA results for anger 
Antiliberal counterfactuals Anticonservative counterfactuals Nonpolitical counterfactuals
Source SS df MS F p SS df MS F p SS df MS F p
Fusion 0.06 1 0.06 0.03 n.s. 0.51 1 0.51 0.354 n.s. 0.15 1 0.15 0.077 n.s.
Affiliation 15.05 1 15.05 7.741 <.01 13.96 1 13.96 9.787 <.01 4.67 1 4.67 2.426 n.s.
Affiliation 
by fusion 29.52 1 29.52 15.181 <.001 2.95 1 2.95 2.069 n.s. 0.96 1 0.96 0.5 n.s.
Error 126.41 65 1.95 92.71 65 1.43 115.45 60 1.92
Total 1797.81 69 1160.50 69 921.42 64
Table 6.8: ANCOVA results for anger
Antiliberal counterfactuals Anticonservative counterfactuals Nonpolitical counterfactuals
Source SS df MS F p SS df MS F p SS df MS F p
Identification 0.44 1 0.44 0.222 n.s. 9.98 1 9.98 7.599 <.01 0.01 1 0.01 0.005 n.s.
Identification 
by affiliation 1.18 1 1.18 0.596 n.s. 5.35 1 5.35 4.071 <.05 0.89 1 0.89 0.452 n.s.
Fusion 0.01 1 0.01 0.004 n.s. 2.92 1 2.92 2.227 n.s. 0.69 1 0.69 0.352 n.s.
Affiliation 0.00 1 0.00 0 n.s. 10.39 1 10.39 7.91 <.01 0.18 1 0.18 0.093 n.s.
Affiliation by 
fusion 15.61 1 15.61 7.853 <.01 7.09 1 7.09 5.4 <.05 0.06 1 0.06 0.03 n.s.
Error 125.19 63 1.99 82.72 63 1.31 113.78 58 1.96
Total 1797.81 69 1160.50 69 921.42 64
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Results for the measure of sorrow are displayed in Figure 6.5.  Sorrow was 
analyzed using the same approach as anger.  Results for the ANOVA analyses are shown 
in Table 6.9.  This analysis found no significant effect for sorrow in response to 
antiliberal, anticonservative, or nonpolitical counterfactuals.  When these analyses were 
followed by the ANCOVAs, the results did not change significantly.  ANCOVA results 
are shown in Table 6.10.  The ANCOVA analyses found no significant effect.
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Table 6.9: ANOVA results for sorrow 
Antiliberal counterfactuals Anticonservative counterfactuals Nonpolitical counterfactuals
Source SS df MS F P SS df MS F p SS df MS F p
Fusion 1.74 1 1.74 0.622 n.s. 0.44 1 0.44 0.195 n.s. 0.52 1 0.52 0.258 n.s.
Affiliation 3.33 1 3.33 1.188 n.s. 0.06 1 0.06 0.027 n.s. 1.15 1 1.15 0.573 n.s.
Affiliation 
by fusion 3.76 1 3.76 1.344 n.s. 0.02 1 0.02 0.009 n.s. 0.17 1 0.17 0.085 n.s.
Error 181.91 65 2.80 147.51 65 2.27 120.24 60 2.00
Total 1525.81 69 1331.44 69 836.50 64
Table 6.10: ANCOVA results for sorrow
Antiliberal counterfactuals Anticonservative counterfactuals Nonpolitical counterfactuals
Source SS df MS F p SS df MS F p SS df MS F p
Identification 0.77 1 0.77 0.268 n.s. 2.16 1 2.16 0.937 n.s. 0.40 1 0.40 0.2 n.s.
Identification 
by affiliation 0.44 1 0.44 0.151 n.s. 0.78 1 0.78 0.338 n.s. 2.96 1 2.96 1.474 n.s.
Fusion 0.64 1 0.64 0.222 n.s. 0.00 1 0.00 0.001 n.s. 1.34 1 1.34 0.665 n.s.
Affiliation 0.02 1 0.02 0.006 n.s. 0.81 1 0.81 0.353 n.s. 2.04 1 2.04 1.016 n.s.
Affiliation by 
fusion 1.66 1 1.66 0.577 n.s. 0.11 1 0.11 0.048 n.s. 1.82 1 1.82 0.906 n.s.
Error 181.14 63 2.88 145.30 63 2.31 116.40 58 2.01
Total 1525.81 69 1331.44 69 836.50 64
Disappointment
Disappointment was analyzed using the same approach as anger and sorrow.  
Results are shown in Figure 6.6.  Results for the ANOVAs are shown in Table 6.11.  
Initial ANOVAs found a significant effect for affiliation in the antiliberal condition such 
that liberals showed more disappointment, which was qualified by a significant fusion by 
affiliation interaction such that fused liberals showed the most disappointment and fused 
conservatives the least.  There were no significant effects found in the anticonservative 
counterfactuals or in response to the nonpolitical counterfactuals.  The results for the 
ANCOVA analyses controlling for identification are shown in Table 6.12.  When 
identification and the identification by affiliation interaction were controlled for, no 
significant effects were found.  
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Table 6.11: ANOVA results for disappointment 
Antiliberal counterfactuals Anticonservative counterfactuals Nonpolitical counterfactuals
Source SS df MS F P SS df MS F p SS df MS F p
Fusion 0.20 1 0.20 0.109 n.s. 0.04 1 0.04 0.027 n.s. 0.02 1 0.02 0.008 n.s.
Affiliation 20.49 1 20.49 11.358 p=.001 0.30 1 0.30 0.184 n.s. 0.10 1 0.10 0.042 n.s.
Affiliation 
by fusion 7.39 1 7.39 4.095 p<.05 1.74 1 1.74 1.055 n.s. 0.02 1 0.02 0.009 n.s.
Error 117.24 65 1.80 106.94 65 1.65 134.76 60 2.25
Total 2043.13 69 1610.56 69 1067.98 64
Table 6.12: ANCOVA results for disappointment
Antiliberal counterfactuals Anticonservative counterfactuals Nonpolitical counterfactuals
Source SS df MS F p SS df MS F p SS df MS F p
Identification 1.01 1 1.01 0.549 n.s. 1.01 1 1.01 0.604 n.s. 0.17 1 0.17 0.074 n.s.
Identification 
by affiliation 1.25 1 1.25 0.681 n.s. 0.00 1 0.00 0 n.s. 2.94 1 2.94 1.311 n.s.
Fusion 0.26 1 0.26 0.139 n.s. 0.84 1 0.84 0.505 n.s. 0.39 1 0.39 0.175 n.s.
Affiliation 0.02 1 0.02 0.013 n.s. 0.02 1 0.02 0.013 n.s. 2.53 1 2.53 1.128 n.s.
Affiliation by 
fusion 2.81 1 2.81 1.529 n.s. 1.26 1 1.26 0.758 n.s. 0.82 1 0.82 0.366 n.s.
Error 115.90 63 1.84 104.98 63 1.67 130.22 58 2.25
Total 2043.13 69 1610.56 69 1067.98 64
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Hope was analyzed in the same way as anger, sorrow, and disappointment.  See 
Figure 6.7.  Results for the initial ANOVAs are reported in Table 6.13.  The ANOVAs 
found no significant effects in response to the antiliberal and anticonservative 
counterfactuals, although in response to the antiliberal counterfactuals both the main 
effect for affiliation and the interaction between fusion and affiliation approached 
significance such that liberals in general and fused liberals in particular showed low rates 
of hope.  There was a significant main effect found for affiliation in response to the 
nonpolitical counterfactuals, such that conservatives showed more hope.  The results for 
the ANCOVAs which controlled for identification and the identification by affiliation 
interaction are shown in Table 6.14.  When these covariates were added, no significant 
81
results were found.  The previously marginal effects for response to antiliberal 
counterfactuals no longer approached significance, and the effect for affiliation in the 
nonpolitical condition was no longer significant.  
Table 6.13: ANOVA results for hope 
Antiliberal counterfactuals Anticonservative counterfactuals Nonpolitical counterfactuals
Source SS df MS F P SS df MS F p SS df MS F p
Fusion 2.56 1 2.56 0.947 n.s. 0.30 1 0.30 0.183 n.s. 0.11 1 0.11 0.063 n.s.
Affiliation 9.52 1 9.52 3.517 0.065 1.63 1 1.63 0.995 n.s. 8.67 1 8.67 4.81 <.05
Affiliation 
by fusion 9.76 1 9.76 3.604 0.062 0.09 1 0.09 0.057 n.s. 1.62 1 1.62 0.899 n.s.
Error 175.95 65 2.71 106.46 65 1.64 108.19 60 1.80
Total 1200.31 69 1450.19 69 1654.08 64
Table 6.14: ANCOVA results for hope
Antiliberal counterfactuals Anticonservative counterfactuals Nonpolitical counterfactuals
Source SS df MS F p SS df MS F p SS df MS F p
Identification 6.20 1 6.20 2.379 n.s. 1.02 1 1.02 0.618 n.s. 0.03 1 0.03 0.016 n.s.
Identification 
by affiliation 0.03 1 0.03 0.01 n.s. 2.03 1 2.03 1.222 n.s. 0.03 1 0.03 0.018 n.s.
Fusion 0.28 1 0.28 0.107 n.s. 0.23 1 0.23 0.137 n.s. 0.00 1 0.00 0 n.s.
Affiliation 0.88 1 0.88 0.336 n.s. 1.04 1 1.04 0.624 n.s. 0.23 1 0.23 0.126 n.s.
Affiliation by 
fusion 6.59 1 6.59 2.53 n.s. 0.24 1 0.24 0.147 n.s. 0.87 1 0.87 0.465 n.s.
Error 164.18 63 2.61 104.44 63 1.66 107.95 58 1.86
Total 1200.31 69 1450.19 69 1654.08 64
DISCUSSION
Overall, these data provide mixed support for the theory that sacred values are an 
outgrowth of the extremist mindset in general and identity fusion in specific.  While there 
were significant findings in line with what were expected, it is also the case that these 
findings did not appear evenly across all the measures.  Still, even this mixed support 
provides some evidence demonstrating a connection between identity fusion and the 




1. Identity fusion with a political affiliation will be a predictor of resistance to 
counterfactuals in the form of greater reported difficulty in considering these 
counterfactuals and more moral outrage, moral cleansing, and stronger 
emotional reactions following the consideration of political counterfactuals
but not following the consideration of nonpolitical counterfactuals
This prediction has several components, all of which reflect the central argument 
that fusion will predict the development of sacred values associated with political 
affiliation.  In the first component it was predicted that people fused with their political 
affiliation would report more difficulty in considering political counterfactuals running 
contrary to their political beliefs than unfused participants, but this effect would not 
replicate in those considering nonpolitical counterfactuals.  The analyses for resistance 
provide some support for this prediction: the ANOVA for anticonservative 
counterfactuals shows the predicted affiliation by fusion interaction, such that fused 
conservatives presented with anticonservative counterfactuals showed the most resistance 
and fused liberals the least.  This effect was not significant in the antiliberal 
counterfactuals, but the data followed the same pattern and the effect approached 
significance. Fusion with the group appears to have the overall effect of increasing 
resistance to counterfactuals which are contrary to the group and decreasing resistance to 
counterfactuals which are in line with the group.  As predicted this was only true in the 
case of the political counterfactuals, providing additional support for the argument that 
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the effects of fusion are specific to domains relevant to the values or beliefs associated 
with the group.  
The second component of this prediction referred to moral outrage.  It was 
predicted that participants who were fused with their political affiliation would, compared 
to participants not fused with their affiliation, show greater rejection and demonization of 
people making counterfactuals that challenge group beliefs. This component was 
somewhat supported by the data: in response to the antiliberal counterfactuals, the 
expected fusion by affiliation interaction was found.  Interestingly, there was no such 
effect found in response to the anticonservative counterfactuals, although there was a 
main effect for affiliation. The fact that these effects emerge most clearly in 
counterfactuals framed as contrary to liberal positions is interesting.  One possible 
explanation for this is that fused liberals are more focused on morality or more willing to 
cast opposition in moral terms than fused conservatives.  This is somewhat at odds with 
research on political ideology, which has tended to argue that casting issues in moral 
terms or greater self-reported concern over moral issues is associated with 
conservativism, not liberalism (Miller, 1994), and also challenged by the fact that fused 
conservatives showed the lowest moral outrage in response to the antiliberal 
counterfactuals.  The data suggest that fused participants in general were more responsive 
to the antiliberal counterfactuals, not necessarily that liberals by themselves were driving 
the effects.  
A second explanation for the differential response across counterfactuals relies on 
context.  Because the data were collected during a period in which the American 
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government was controlled primarily by the Republican party, participants may have seen 
liberals as a minority opinion (the majority of these data were collected in the spring and 
fall of 2006, when the Republican Party controlled both the Presidency and Congress).  
This could have the effect of making both liberals and conservatives respond more to 
counterfactuals framed as contrary to liberal positions: because conservatives dominated 
the political landscape, counterfactuals framed as contrary to liberal perspectives could be 
seen as more likely to mirror the framing of such issues in the public sphere.  The 
antiliberal counterfactuals may have caused greater response because those arguments 
were more likely to affect policy than counterfactuals expressing the minority opinion.
An alternate explanation which also relies on context would be that the specific 
items framed as antiliberal draw more on moral issues than those framed as 
anticonservative: although the items were designed to be balanced, they were not 
pretested to see if the moral weight was the same across the political conditions.  Without 
this comparison, it is possible that the differential effects found in moral outrage are due 
to the relevance of morals to the specific situations presented in the antiliberal 
counterfactuals.
The third component of this prediction referred to moral cleansing behavior, or 
behavior designed to reaffirm membership in the group and support for its perspective.  
The analyses of moral cleansing items found a significant effect for fusion, but no effect 
for condition or fusion by condition interaction as was predicted.  These results suggest 
that people fused with their political affiliation were more likely in general to endorse the 
moral cleansing items, and that this was not strongly affected by the consideration of 
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counterfactuals.  Most likely this is a reflection of the content of these items: because 
moral cleansing was operationally defined as pro-group behavior or sacrifice, what these 
items show is that people fused with their political affiliation are more likely to engage in 
pro-group behavior. While this is certainly support for the argument that fusion is related 
to commitment to the groups, this does not provide support for the argument that 
exposure to political counterfactuals led to an increase in moral cleansing behavior. One 
possible explanation for this is the fact that not all of the counterfactuals ran in opposition 
to the participants’ political beliefs.  This may have reduced the overall impact of 
considering political counterfactuals, because in addition to counterfactuals that 
challenged values associated with group membership participants were also being 
exposed to counterfactuals that reaffirmed these values.
The final component of this prediction had to do with emotional reaction to the 
counterfactuals.  It was predicted that relative to participants not fused with their political 
affiliation, fused participants would show a stronger emotional response to political 
counterfactuals contrary to their political opinion, and that this effect would not be found 
in response to nonpolitical counterfactuals.  The data showed mixed support for this 
prediction.  There was neither a main effect for fusion nor an interaction between fusion 
and political affiliation for measures of sorrow or hope, although for hope in the 
antiliberal condition the interaction between fusion and affiliation approached 
significance.  However, there was a significant interaction between fusion and affiliation 
for self-reported anger in the antiliberal condition, with fused liberals showing the most 
anger and fused conservatives showing the least.  A similar effect was for disappointment 
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was found in response to the antiliberal counterfactuals.  While not all of the emotional 
responses identified in Tetlock et al. (2000) were found in this sample, the findings for 
anger and disappointment do support the overall prediction that fusion encourages drastic 
reaction to counterattitudinal counterfactuals.  One possibility for the lack of effects for 
sorrow and hope is that these emotions may be more difficult to evoke and political 
counterfactuals just not impactful enough in this sample to pull them out.
As with moral outrage, the majority of the effects in the ANOVA analyses of 
emotional response were found in response to antiliberal counterfactuals.  As with moral 
outrage, it was also the case that the interaction did not appear to focus on only one 
group: in both anger and disappointment, fused liberals showed the most emotional 
response while fused conservatives showed the least, suggesting that it was not only one 
group driving these effects.  This reinforces the context explanations and suggests that
this difference in responding may therefore be due either to a general societal context 
which made participants more reactive to counterfactuals framed as contrary to liberal 
positions or because the specific counterfactuals framed as antiliberal focused on issues 
that evoked stronger responses.
Collectively, these analyses provide support for the prediction that fusion should 
predict resistance to political counterfactuals.  It is clearly the case that fused people were 
more reactive to political counterfactuals than nonpolitical counterfactuals, and that 
across measures there was an inconsistently significant but stable (in terms of the 
direction of the means) finding that fusion lead participants to react more strongly to the 
counterfactuals than unfused participants.  Although not found for every item, in general 
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the effects suggest that fused participants did react as if they had developed sacred values 
in line with the group.
Prediction 2: 
2. Fusion will be an effective predictor of resistance to counterfactuals even 
when controlling for identification.
Earlier tests of sacred values have avoided directly addressing the question of how 
these sacred values develop, and have assessed the likelihood of any person having pro-
group sacred values through tests which measure membership with the group or self-
reported strength of belief.  One fundamental prediction of the identity fusion approach is 
that strength of identification with a group is a poor measure of these effects, because 
sacred values are an outgrowth of fusion, which is distinct from identification.  Therefore, 
while fusion is associated with strong identification, the effects of fusion should exist 
even when controlling for identification.  
The ANCOVA analyses provide some support for this prediction.  In the case of 
resistance to counterfactuals and anger, controlling for identification weakened many of 
the results some but did not change the findings dramatically.  In fact, when identification 
was controlled for in the analysis for anger as a response to anticonservative 
counterfactuals, the result was that the affiliation by fusion interaction was actually found 
to be significant.  In the case of the findings for hope, disappointment, and moral outrage, 
the inclusion of the identification covariates significantly weakened the fusion effects.  
Despite this, identification was not a consistent predictor of the effects.  Identification by 
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itself was only found to be a significant predictor of moral cleansing and anger as a result 
of consideration of anticonservative counterfactuals, although in the latter case this was 
qualified by a significant identification by affiliation interaction.  A similar identification 
by affiliation interaction was found to predict moral outrage in response to antiliberal 
counterfactuals.
It is interesting that the effects which appear most resistant to the inclusion of 
identification were found in resistance to counterfactuals and in anger.  This may be 
significant because unlike moral outrage (where identification had a large effect), these 
items were framed in terms of participants’ response to the counterfactual itself.  Moral 
outrage was framed as a response to individuals who make the counterfactual argument 
rather than a response to the counterfactual itself.  Research in social identity theory has 
suggested that identification with a group may be one element which predicts willingness 
to derogate or develop bias against outgroups (e.g. Shamir & Sagiv-Schifter, 2006).  The 
particularly strong impact of identification on the moral outrage measures may be
accounted for by this effect, as the moral outrage measures represent the kind of 
antioutgroup sentiment that has been associated with identification.
In contrast, the measures of resistance and emotional response are related to the 
participants’ processing of the counterfactual arguments.  These reactions: a refusal to 
consider the counterfactual, and a significant negative emotional response to the 
counterfactual, have less to do with the participants’ conception of who it is that would 
make such an argument, and more directly assess whether the participants are willing to 
engage with the argument itself in a rational or calculative way.  This negation is key to 
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the Sacred Value Protection Model and arguably a more direct measure of the kind of 
absolutism associated with extremism than rejection of individuals making counterfactual 
arguments.  As would be predicted if identity fusion did represent the underlying 
psychology of extremism, this absolutism appears in these data to be more strongly 
affected by fusion than identification.
General discussion
Although the findings were slightly inconsistent, taken together these data do 
provide support for the argument that fusion is related to the psychology of sacred values.  
Fused participants reacted to political counterfactuals contrary to their political affiliation 
with more resistance, moral outrage, and anger as would be predicted by the Sacred 
Value Protection Model.  These effects did not emerge in nonpolitical counterfactuals, 
demonstrating that the findings were not due to general processing tendencies among 
fused participants.
I should add several caveats to these conclusions.  One is related to the persistent 
difference between reactions to the antiliberal counterfactuals and the anticonservative 
counterfactuals. While the reactions of both liberals and conservatives to these items 
suggest that this difference is due to context rather than reactivity of the participants 
themselves, this difference was not predicted and cannot be fully explained with these 
data.  One way to disambiguate the potential explanations is to replicate this study: if the 
antiliberal counterfactuals continue to evoke the most response even as the political 
climate changes, then it is likely to be related to the specific issues selected as antiliberal.  
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A second caveat is prompted by the lack of a consistent difference between 
affiliations in response to the political counterfactuals.  Because the items were designed 
to evoke differences between liberals and conservatives, the lack of consistent strong 
responses along this axis suggests that the items may not have been impactful enough to 
evoke such differences.  It is possible that, as in Study 1, this is attributable mainly to the 
fact that the majority of the sample was young enough that politics is not seen as 
interesting enough to generate a response.  However, the fact that many of the findings 
show significant effects for political affiliation even if not all do does provide heartening 
evidence that the counterfactuals did evoke a differential response across affiliations.  
Even with these caveats, these data do provide support for the argument that the 
psychology of sacred values may be related to identity fusion.  This provides an 
important theoretical underpinning for research in the Sacred Value Protection Model.  
By casting sacred values as an identity fusion, and therefore self-related phenomenon, 
these data open the door to a greater understanding of how sacred values develop, why 
people respond to challenges to sacred values in the way that they do, and how to best 
approach situations in which sacred values are relevant.  By looking at the response to 
challenged sacred values as an extension of self-protection and self-verification 
responses, future work in this area can explore how to address sacred values without 
challenging the self or how to provide support to challenged self-views in ways other 
than resistance and moral outrage.  
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Chapter 7: Study 3
The three studies in this dissertation used studied extremism in the context of 
political affiliation.  This is based on the premise that extremism is a psychological state 
defined by the elements of moral authority, absolutism, and a sense of threat, not by 
specific beliefs contrary to mainstream opinion or membership in groups deemed 
abnormal.  This is somewhat different than the way that the term extremism is popularly 
used, in that most people deemed extremists or members of extremist groups are 
associated with violent or otherwise radical groups working to accomplish goals which 
are greatly at odds with traditional mainstream political opinion.  One fundamental 
argument of the approach taken in this dissertation is the idea that these kinds of violent 
or otherwise extreme behaviors are not the only possible outcome of an extremist form of 
association with the group.  In fact, the identity fusion formulation would argue that there 
should be a strong interaction between the development of fusion with a group and the 
teachings of that group in predicting the likelihood of violent or antisocial behavior.  
Because fusion is characterized by a strong association between the personal and social 
self-views, behavior should be shaped strongly by the content of both.  If the avowed and 
public social prototype of the group includes strongly prosocial behavior, then fusion 
would likely increase the chance of prosocial behavior in the group members.  In the 
same way that anonymity can actually increase prosocial behavior if group norms 
encourage it (Johnson & Downing, 1979), it is likely that fusion with a peaceful group 
would have the effect of decreasing the chance of violence even alongside the 
development of moral authority, absolutism, and a sense of threat.
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If this is true, then it should be possible to find examples of this kind of “day-to-
day” extremism in mainstream groups that do not encourage the use of violence.  One 
example of a domain which includes strong group identities and moralistic language that 
lends itself well to the development of extremist ideologies is the political arena.  Many 
people identify very strongly with social identities of “liberal,” “conservative,” 
“Republican,” or “Democrat,” as can be seen by the almost ubiquitous sight of bumper 
stickers used to proclaim a political identity (Endersby & Towle, 1996).  The relatively 
pacifistic norms existing in the political domain suggest that if someone were to develop
a fused identity with one of these groups, it is unlikely that any extremist mindset would 
display itself in violence against the outgroup.  However, it should display itself in other 
ways.  One such way may be in resistance to compromise: since politics is in part a 
negotiation that requires compromise with the outgroup, and the absolutist element of 
extremism makes compromise unattractive, it is very likely that these extremist beliefs 
would come out as a rejection of any form of compromise.  This study attempts to 
establish a connection between identity fusion and this kind of day-to-day political 
extremism.
People making political decisions often have to make compromises.  A candidate 
offers a platform which represents his or her stance on a wide variety of issues.  For most 
moderate candidates, these positions may cover a range of perspectives and voters 
deciding if they wish to vote for the candidate or not must weigh their position on a 
variety of issues to make the decision.  Because an important element of the extremist 
mindset is the idea that the group is absolutely correct, this weighing process should be 
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extremely difficult in that it requires the voter to compare different political opinions and 
decide which is the most important.  As demonstrated by Study 2, people who are 
strongly aligned with the group reject this kind of comparison quite strongly.  It is very 
likely that an extremist will refuse to negotiate or compromise their perspective enough 
to vote for a candidate, even if their ultimate goal may be better served by such a 
compromise.  Additionally, because extremists tend to assume the worst of opposing 
groups, the idea of compromise may be inherently less appealing.  If the opposing group 
is seen as actively immoral, then compromise may be very unattractive.
Study 2 was a survey study that sought to establish a link between identity fusion 
and political extremism.  There were two specific predictions made in this study.  If 
voting for a particular candidate means tacitly endorsing the perspectives of that 
candidate even when they do not completely overlap with their own beliefs, most people 
will make a rational calculation of how important their various goals are and how this 
candidate represents them.  For someone fused with a group or ideology, this type of 
calculated trade-off should be seen as a threat to their self-views, and hence extremely 
unappealing.  Because of this, it is likely that fused people will be less inclined to 
compromise on their preferences.  It was predicted that:
1. People who are fused with a particular ideology will be more likely to refuse 
to compromise their preferences on political issues.
Because extremists believe that their group is morally right, and their opponents 
are immoral, the idea of a compromise may be particularly unappealing.  In this case, 
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compromising is not a diplomatic act, but instead an endorsement of immoral behavior.  
If identity fusion is related to this belief, then people who are fused with a group should 
demonstrate less willingness to compromise with opponents.  Therefore it was predicted 
that:
2. People who are fused with a political ideology will endorse a more combative 
and less cooperative description of the political process.
This study also gives an opportunity to examine the language use of fused 
participants.  Research has suggested that there may be stable linguistic differences in the 
language used by extremist groups in publicly released documents (Smith, 2004) and by 
extremists in online discussion (Seyle & Pennebaker, 2007).  If fusion is related to 
extremism, then there should be stable differences in the language used by fused 
participants in this context as well.  Earlier research in extremism suggested that the 
strongest linguistic correlates of extremism were found in patterns of pronoun use, with 
extremists using more “we” language, less “I,” and using more third-person pronouns.  
Therefore it was predicted that:
3. There will be a stable difference between fused and unfused participants in the 
pronouns used to describe those within and opposed to the group.
METHOD
Participants
Participants included undergraduate psychology students who enrolled in this 
experiment for class credit and members of the general population of the Internet who 
95
were recruited from postings on volunteer websites and listings of online experiments.  
Undergraduates received class credit for participating, while participants from the general 
population were entered into a drawing for gift cards as a thank-you for their 
participation.  Only American citizens who indicated voting in 2004 or 2006 or intentions 
to vote in 2006 were included in the sample.  Two-hundred and twenty-two eligible
participants responded to this survey, including 164 from the undergraduate research pool 
(106 F, 56 M, 2 no information given; mean age = 18.994, SD = 1.34, median age = 19)
and 44 from the general population of the Internet (36 F, 8 M; mean age = 33.30, SD = 
11.45, median age = 30.5).
Materials and Procedure
After being directed to the study website, participants read an informed consent 
document and entered their initials in order to proceed.  Participants initially completed a 
measure of political affiliation (including the items “extremely liberal/progressive, 
moderate liberal, moderate, moderate conservative, extremely conservative, libertarian, 
and other”),   age, gender, American citizenship, and the organizational identification and 
identity fusion scales for their self-nominated political affiliation.  Following this, 
participants responded to writing prompts asking them to describe what their answer on 
the identity fusion scale meant to them, what their political affiliation meant to them, the 
typical conservative, the typical liberal, conservatives as a group, and liberals as a group.  
After writing these responses, participants completed the dependent measures for refusal 
to compromise and endorsement of combative politics.  Refusal to compromise on voting 
issues was assessed by asking participants how much each of the following issues 
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affected their vote: “abortion, tax policy, the war on drugs, national security, the war on 
terror, social security, welfare reform, and health care.” Responses were on a scale from 1 
to 9, with 9 indicating that they would not vote for a candidate with a different 
perspective than themselves on the issue.  Combative perspective on politics was 
assessed with six items assessing willingness to compromise (including: “Political 
compromise is never a good idea.”) and rejection of opposing parties (including: “The 
political party opposing my affiliation is entirely wrong: they have no positions at all that 
I agree with”).  See Appendix D for materials used in this study.
RESULTS
Fusion and identification measures
Final results include 70 fused participants and 138 unfused.  Identification was 
scored as the sum of responses to the organizational identification scale (mean = 15.02, 
SD = 4.48).  See Table 7.1
Table 7.1: Fusion and identification scores across political affiliations
Political affiliation N N (%) Fused Mean identification
Extremely liberal 13 6 (46.2%) 16.92
Moderate liberal 76 29 (38.2%) 16.30
Moderate 44 12 (27.3%) 12.72
Moderate conservative 59 16 (27.1%) 14.27
Extremely conservative 7 5 (71.4%) 21.71
Libertarian 9 2 (22%) 12.56
Total 208 70 (33.7%) 15.02
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Impact of issues on voting decisions
Two separate analyses were conducted to assess the impact of fusion with 
political affiliation on voting decisions.  To determine if there were significant 
differences across political affiliations, these analyses also including political affiliation 
as a predictor.  In order to increase the number of participants per cell and keep analyses 
similar across measures, a measure of political affiliation was computed as in Study 2 by 
excluding moderates and libertarians from the analysis and dichotomizing the remaining 
participants into conservative or liberal group.  




















The first analysis for the impact of issues looked at the mean response across all 
issues.  A 2(fusion: fused vs. unfused) x 2(political affiliation: liberal or conservative) 
ANOVA was conducted to identify the effects of fusion on average impact of political 
issues on participants’ voting decisions.  This ANOVA found a significant main effect for 
fusion such that fused participants showed a stronger impact of issues (F(1, 151) = 4.372, 
p<.05) but no effect for political affiliation (F(1, 151) = .080, n.s.) or interaction between 
fusion and political affiliation (F(1, 151) = 1.120, n.s.).  See Figure 7.1 for results.  
Following this ANOVA, the effects were tested to see if they appeared when 
identification was controlled for.  A 2(fusion: fused vs. unfused) x 2(political affiliation: 
liberal or conservative) ANCOVA was computed, including identification and the 
identification by affiliation interaction term (calculated by multiplying identification by 
affiliation, coded as liberals = 0 and conservatives = 1) as covariates.  When these 
covariates were included identification was found to be a significant predictor (F(1, 148) 
= 5.266, p<.05) but there were no other effects found.  Fusion was no longer a significant 
predictor (F(1, 148) = .100, n.s.), nor was political affiliation (F(1, 148) = .031, n.s.), the 
interaction of affiliation by fusion (F(1, 148) = .437, n.s.), or the identification by 
affiliation interaction term (F(1, 148) = .059, n.s.).
The second analysis of these data looked at the total number of issues the participants 
identified as issues for which they would not vote with a candidate who did not share 
their perspective (a score of “8” on that item).   As above, this was initially tested with a 
2(fusion: fused vs. unfused) x 2(political affiliation: liberal or conservative) ANOVA.  
This found no significant main effect for political affiliation (F(1, 151) = .074, n.s.) or 
99
fusion (F(1, 148) = 2.128, n.s.).  The interaction between fusion and affiliation 
approached significance such that fused conservatives showed the largest number of 
issues marked as refusing to compromise (F(1, 148) = 3.724, p=.056).  See Figure 7.2.  
This was followed by a 2(fusion: fused vs. unfused) x 2(political affiliation: liberal or 
conservative) ANCOVA with identification and the identification by affiliation 
interaction terms entered as covariates.  When these were entered, the analysis showed no 
significant effect for identification (F(1, 148) = 2.324, n.s.), the identification by 
affiliation interaction (F(1, 148) = .320, n.s.), political affiliation (F(1, 148) = .478, n.s.), 
or fusion (F(1, 148) = .427, n.s.).  The fusion by affiliation interaction was still found to 
approach significance (F(1, 148) = 3.375, p=.068).














Endorsement of combative politics
The final score for endorsement of combative politics was found by computing a 
sum of the responses to the six items assessing a refusal to compromise (mean = 22.65, 
SD = 7.637).  This score was analyzed by a 2(fusion: fused vs. unfused) x 2(political 
affiliation: liberal vs. conservative) ANOVA.  This analysis found a significant main 
effect for affiliation such that conservatives indicated more endorsement of combative 
politics (F(1, 151) = 5.524, p<.05), and a significant main effect for fusion such that 
fused participants endorsed these items more (F(1, 151) = 6.119, p<.05).  There was no 
significant fusion by affiliation interaction (F(1, 151) = 2.121, n.s.).  As above, this was 
followed by a 2(fusion: fused vs. unfused) x 2(political affiliation: liberal or 
conservative) ANCOVA with identification and the identification by affiliation 











interaction terms entered as covariates to determine if these effects held true when 
identification was controlled for.  This analysis found no effect.  Identification was not a 
significant covariate (F(1, 148) = .906, n.s.), nor was the identification by affiliation 
interaction term (F(1, 148) = .578, n.s.).  The effects for fusion and affiliation were no 
longer significant (fusion F(1, 148) = 1.488; affiliation (F(1, 148) = .013, both n.s.).
Linguistic analysis
Linguistic data were analyzed using the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count 
(LIWC) program, a text analysis program that analyzes word usage across a variety of 
psychologically meaningful categories (Pennebaker, Francis, & Booth, 2001).  This 
program describes individual texts by showing the percentage of words in that text that 
fall into 72 separate categories.  To get a stable percentage score, only participants who 
wrote 25 words or more for that question were included in each analysis.  Participants did 
not respond at length to the prompts “describe what your answer on the identity fusion 
scale meant to you,” “describe liberals in general” and “describe conservatives in 
general,” and when texts of less than 25 words were excluded there were too few texts 
remaining to effectively analyze (n = 33 for fusion scale prompt, 44 when discussing own 
affiliation, and 55 when discussing opposing affiliation).  Responses to these items were 
not analyzed.
Earlier research in the linguistic correlates of extremism identified a linguistic 
fingerprint of extremism characterized by a high use of “we” language, a low use of “I” 
language, high use of third-person plural pronouns, and increased use of negative 
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emotion language (Seyle & Pennebaker, 2007).  Following this research, the current 
study focused on these linguistic categories.
Response to prompt “What does your affiliation mean to you”
A series of 2(fusion: fused vs. unfused) by 2(political affiliation: liberal vs. 
conservative) ANCOVAs with identification and the identification by affiliation 
interaction terms entered as covariates were conducted on the LIWC categories of the use 
of “I” language (“I,”“me,”“my”), the use of “We” language (“we,”“us,”“our”), 
references to others (including “they,” “them,” and “their” as well as ”he,” “you,” and 
similar references), and negative emotion words. The only significant effects found 
appeared in the measure of “I” language, where a main effect for fusion was found such 
that fused participants used significantly more “I” language (F(1,81) = 5.290, p<.05), and 
in “We” language where identification was found to be a significant predictor (F(1,81) = 
6.487, p<.05).  No other significant effects were found.  See Figure 7.4.
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Response to prompt “Describe how you see the average member of your affiliation”
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Participants responded to two linguistic prompts asking them to describe the 
average liberal and the average conservative.  These were recoded according to political 
affiliation to create a measure of how participants described members of their own 
affiliation and members of the opposing affiliation.  The first analysis looked at the 
difference between fused and unfused participants describing members of their own 
political affiliation.  When those who had written less than 25 words were removed from 
the analysis, the final sample included 93 texts (mean word count = 46.78, SD = 19.23).  
As above, to analyze this language a series of 2(fusion: fused vs. unfused) x 2(political 
affiliation: liberal vs. conservative) x identification (continuous) x the identification by
affiliation interaction term ANCOVAs including “I” language, “We” language, other 
words, and negative emotion words as dependent measures were conducted.  
These ANCOVAs found no significant differences, although as with the 
descriptions of the group in general fused participants did use more “I” language and this
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effect approached significance (F(1,86) = 3.146, p=.080).  No other effects were found.  
See Figure 7.5.
Response to prompt “Describe how you see the average member of the opposing 
affiliation”
Response to the prompts “describe the average liberal” and “describe the average 
conservative” were recoded to create a measure of how participants described the average 
member of the opposing affiliation.  After excluding participants who wrote less than 25 
words, the final sample included 87 texts (mean word count = 49.6, SD = 23.00).  As 
with earlier analyses, the relationship between fusion and affiliation was tested using a 
series of 2(fusion: fused vs. unfused) x 2(political affiliation: liberal vs. conservative) x 
identification (continuous) x the identification by affiliation interaction term ANCOVAs.  
These analyses found few effects.  The only significant effect found in these data 
was for identification, which was a significant predictor of the use of “I” language 
(F(1,80) = 4.303, p<.05).  There was no significant effect found for fusion when 
identification was controlled for.  See Figure 7.6.
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The goal of this study was to explore the relationship between identity fusion and 
behavior characteristic of extremism in the political realm.  Although, as with earlier 
studies, the lack of a large population of fused participants posed some problems with 
testing this relationship, in general these analyses provide some support for the argument 
that fusion is related to political extremism.  
Specific predictions
Prediction 1: 
1. People who are fused with a particular ideology will be more likely to refuse 
to compromise their preferences on political issues.
This prediction was tested in analyses of two measures of issue voting.  Initial 
analyses for both the overall importance placed on issues by participants and the number 
of issues participants report a refusal to compromise on support this prediction.  In the 
first case, fusion was a significant predictor of the overall importance placed on issues.  
In the second case, although the main effect was not significant the interaction between 
fusion and affiliation approached significance.   These effects were weak and 
inconsistent, in that when identification was entered into the analysis the effects for 
fusion as a predictor of overall response to the issues were no longer significant, and the 
interaction between fusion and affiliation for the number of issues for which participants 
refused to compromise was not actually significant.  
These results do not strongly support the prediction of this study.  However, the 
interaction between fusion and affiliation in the measure of the number of issues for 
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which participants refuse to compromise is intriguing, and should be followed up on with
a larger sample and a more restricted definition of fusion to see if it appears again in 
another sample.  This finding is interesting because contrary to prediction, it only 
appeared in conservatives. This may represent the kind of preference for rigid and 
uncompromising worldviews that has been hypothesized to characterize political 
conservativism (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003), but an alternative 
explanation is that it reflects the greater organization and shared perspectives in the 
modern American conservative movement (Micklethwait & Woolridge, 2004).  With 
such unanimity, there might be more agreement that all the issues are important or at least 
shared agreement that many issues are important.  In contrast, the diversity and lack of a 
unified perspective in the American liberal movements may lead fused liberals to focus 
on a smaller number of key issues.
Prediction 2:
2. People who are fused with a political ideology will endorse a more combative and 
less cooperative description of the political process.
This prediction was tested with the six item measure of combative politics.  As 
with the analyses for impact of issues on voting decisions, these analyses found a 
significant effect for fusion when identification was not controlled for that went away 
when identification was entered into the analyses.  Unlike the earlier finding, however, 
identification was not a significant predictor in the full ANCOVA.  These data provide 
somewhat limited support for the prediction that fusion will lead to higher endorsement 
of combative politics, but do suggest that such a relationship exists (in that fusion was a 
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significant predictor when identification was not controlled for).  The finding that 
conservatives are more inclined to endorse combative politics is interesting, and may 
relate to the hypothesized individual level correlates of conservativism identified by Jost 
and colleagues.  However, the importance of context should not be overlooked: as in 
Study 2, the majority of these data were collected when conservatives controlled the 
American government, and this endorsement of combative politics may reflect the fact 
that the majority party gains the most by refusing to compromise.
Prediction 3: 
3. There will be a stable difference between fused and unfused participants in the 
language used to describe those within and opposed to the group.
This prediction was tested through the LIWC analyses of texts written by 
participants.  Earlier research in the linguistic correlates of extremism found a fingerprint 
of extremism characterized by a high use of “We,” a low use of “I,” high rates of 
negative emotion words, and many references to others.  Because of this, the analyses 
focused on these linguistic categories.  Not many significant effects were found for these
categories, and those that were found were at odds with earlier research.  Interestingly, 
fused participants did not use fewer “I” words when describing their affiliation in general 
or when describing the average member of their affiliation.  In fact, in both cases fused 
participants used more “I” words than unfused (although the effect was only statistically 
significant in the first case).  This effect was not what was predicted by earlier research.  
One possible explanation for the gap between this research and earlier research is found 
in the effects for identification.  Identification was a significant predictor of “We” 
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language when participants were describing their own affiliation, and it is possible that 
the effects found in earlier research are attributable to the effects of identification.  The 
fact that fused participants used more “I” language is interesting.  Although it does not 
support the argument that fusion leads people to talk in extremist ways, it does suggest 
that fused participants responded to these linguistic prompts from a perspective which 
included the personal self.  This is in line with the fundamental argument that fusion is 
related to a particularly strong association between the personal and social levels of the 
self-concept.
In general, the linguistic findings do not strongly support the prediction that 
fusion would be a stable predictor of linguistic differences.  The differences found were 
inconsistent and did not appear across all three text samples analyzed.  
General discussion
Taken together, these data provide inconsistent support for the predictions 
that identity fusion is predictive of rigid, uncompromising forms of political behavior 
such as would be expected to develop from extremist alignment with the group.  Fused 
participants did show significantly a greater impact of issues on their voting decisions
and more strongly endorsed a model of American politics which deemphasizes 
compromise in favor of a majoritarian perspective where the minority party plays no role 
in political decisionmaking, although both these effects disappeared when identification 
was controlled for. The linguistic data did not demonstrate a consistent difference 
between fused and unfused participants.  
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In general, Study 3 found interesting and evocative findings, but nothing 
consistent or stable enough to be considered genuinely strong evidence in line with 
predictions.  More research is needed with a larger sample, so that a more restrictive 
definition of fusion can be used.  It is possible that some of the weak effects found in this 
study may be more robust when such a sample is collected.
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Chapter 8: General Discussion
Until recently, social psychology as a field was not particularly focused on 
questions relating to extremism.  While that has changed somewhat, the fact remains that 
research in the psychology of extremism is currently underdeveloped.  Existing research 
has focused on describing the psychological state of extremism and the definition of the 
extremism used in this dissertation (which defines extremism in terms of the perceived 
moral authority of the group, an absolutist perspective on the group’s teachings, and a 
sense of threat) represents the developing general consensus across this work.  While 
there is such a consensus as to what characterizes extremism, there is no such consensus 
(and in fact, very little research) as to what psychological processes may lead to this state.
Most of the existing research has tended to focus on either real or perceived 
intergroup conflict or some form of social identity processes as underlying the 
development of extremism.  The body of evidence is tilting towards the argument that 
while group conflict may play a role in developing intergroup stereotyping, extremism 
itself is strongly related to social identity processes (e.g. Glaser, Dixit, & Green, 2002).  
This suggests that something about the formation or structure of the self-concept is 
leading to the development of extremism.  
Research into the developing construct of identity fusion (Swann, Seyle, Gomez, 
Morales, & Huici, 2007) has provided an approach to explaining the psychology of 
extremism.  Traditional research in social identity has argued that the self-concept is 
composed of separate but related cognitive schema which contain information about 
ourselves as individuals distinct from others (personal self-views) as well as information 
about ourselves as members of groups (social self-views).  In most people, these different 
elements of the self-concept are assumed to be distinct and (although interconnected) 
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capable of being activated more or less independently (Trafimow, Triandis, & Goto, 
1991).  The identity fusion approach argues that for some people, the connections 
between the self as an individual and the perceptions of the self as a member of a group 
may become so strong that the activation of one element of the self may prime the 
activation of the other level of the self.  Rather than being distinct, the different elements 
of the self-concept may be “fused.”  In this case, the fused person should draw fairly little 
distinction between the self as an individual and the group.  This state of identity fusion is 
hypothesized to be an outgrowth of self-verification motives: when a person needs 
verification of his or her existing self-views, a group which provides a social prototype 
that supports these self-views will be extremely attractive (Swann, Polzer, Seyle, & Ko, 
2004), and if it provides verification for enough of the self-views or strong enough 
verification for the central self-views in question, the person may construct his or her 
self-concept in such a way that fusion is the result.
This hypothesized state of identity fusion provides a theoretical model which fits 
neatly with the observed criteria that define extremism.  If group members saw little 
distinction between themselves as an individual and the group, then self-relevant 
processes would tend to lead them to see the group in moral terms, self-verification 
processes would predict the absolutist defense of the group, and the interaction between 
these two processes would contribute to the development of a sense of threat.  There are 
therefore good theoretical which suggest that identity fusion may be a useful model for 
describing the psychology of extremism.  
RESEARCH FINDINGS
This research in this dissertation attempted to test this theoretical connection 
between fusion and extremism through a series of three studies.  Study 1 examined the 
hypothesized connection between self-verification and identity fusion in political 
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affiliations.  This study explored the motivational pathways that may lead someone to 
become an extremist. Study 2 examined the cognitive effects of identity fusion and the 
connections between these effects and extremism.  Research on the Sacred Value 
Protection Model (Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000) has identified a 
particular type of cognitive rigidity associated with the protection of key values that 
provides an excellent description of the cognitive patterns associated with extremism.  
Study 2 argued that if extremism is associated with identity fusion, then identity fusion 
should predict the rejection of counterattitudinal messages associated with the Sacred 
Value Protection Model. Study 3 examined the self-reported behavioral effects of 
identity fusion and the association between fusion and extremist patterns of behavior, 
including language use.  Taken together, these three studies attempted to lay out the 
motivational, cognitive, and behavioral correlates of fusion with a political affiliation and 
draw connections between these correlates and political extremism.  
The findings of these three studies were mixed.  There was little support for the 
argument that identity fusion with political groups was the result of verification motives 
in this sample.  In Study 1, verification manipulations effectively changed the 
participants’ emotional reaction to the study but failed to encourage the development of 
identity fusion even when participants were placed in groups which primed their political 
affiliations.  These manipulations did not increase fusion with the group, however.  The 
cognitive connections between fusion and extremism were more strongly supported.  The 
results of Study 2 show that fusion predicted resistance to many of the political
counterfactuals which ran contrary to the beliefs of the fused group, moral outrage or 
rejection of the person making such arguments, and anger as a response to the arguments.  
While the effects were somewhat inconsistent in that they did not appear across all 
measures or equally across anticonservative and antiliberal counterfactuals, in general the 
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findings supported the argument that fused participants showed cognitive responses 
which mirrored those of extremists to political counterfactuals, and that these effects 
were extant even though traditional identification measures were controlled for.  
The tests of the behavioral effects of fusion likewise showed very weak effects.  
In Study 3, fused participants indicated a greater response to items assessing political 
extremism than unfused participants, but this finding tended to disappear when 
identification was controlled for.
In general, the results of these three studies suggest that identity fusion may 
describe the psychological underpinnings of the state of extremism, but the picture drawn 
from the data is not completely clear.  It appears that the identity fusion measure is 
associated with cognitive responses that are in line with what is expected from extremists, 
These results do not, however, support the motivational argument that identity fusion is 
an outgrowth of self-verification motives.  Past research in identity fusion has 
demonstrated that people who are fused can use feedback at the social level of the self-
concept to meet verification needs at the personal level of the self (Swann, Seyle, Gomez, 
Morales, & Huici, 2007), but the motivational connection moving in the other direction is 
as yet unestablished and this research does not provide strong evidence for such a 
connection.  While it is possible that this is related to the generally anemic response the 
participants had towards these political groups or the specific manipulation of online 
discussion, it is also possible that the connection between verification motives and fusion 
is strongest in people who are already fused rather than playing a major role in the 
development of fusion itself.  It is also the case that the predicted relationship between 
fusion and extremist behaviors was not strongly supported.
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FLAWS IN EXISTING RESEARCH
There were several problems with the research which weaken the potential 
strength of these findings.  The two major flaws are the lack of a large sample of fused 
participants when using the strict definition of fusion and the generally lackadaisical 
response of participants to the political measures in general.  Both of these flaws are 
likely related to the fact that the samples used were composed largely of young people, 
who tend to display overall low levels of political interest and engagement (Zukin, 
Keeter, Andolina, Jenkins, & Delli Carpini, 2006).  While there were people from a fairly 
wide age range in all three studies, in general the prototypical participant was fairly 
young and fairly uninvested in politics.  The result is that many participants showed low 
rates of fusion and identification with the group.  The broader definition of fusion used 
here addressed the statistical problems associated with such a small number of fused 
participants, but added significant noise to the analysis that probably obscured significant 
effects.  
Similarly, the lack of interest in politics may have hidden some effects 
attributable to fusion.  The core argument that connects verification motives to identity 
fusion is the idea that when a group is seen as relevant to the self and containing 
implications which fit with existing self-views, that group will be attractive as a source of 
self-verification needs.  If the participants in these studies failed to see political affiliation 
as being a particularly relevant group to them, then the materials used in these studies 
would likely fail to evoke strong responses.  This would have the effect of reducing the 
overall impact of the studies, and concealing any real effects between fusion and the 
focus of the studies.  The overall result of this flaw is that while the existing effects are 
likely to be replicable, there is a good possibility that other effects exist as well which 
cannot be measured with this specific set of studies.
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There is also the general problem of generalizability.  Since these studies focused 
on political behavior, and there are strong generational differences in political behavior 
(Zukin et al.  2006), the fact that the sample as a whole was very young poses a problem 
in generalizing from this sample to others.  However, the connections between the 
identity fusion and pro-group behavior have been demonstrated in more diverse 
populations (Swann, Seyle, Gomez, Morales, & Huici, 2007), suggesting that the specific 
effects associated with identity fusion in these studies may be likely to generalize even 
though the focus was on the political domain.  
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
The primary goal of this research was to advance the understanding of the 
psychology of extremism by exploring the connections between extremism and self-
related constructs, particularly identity fusion.  By developing a greater understanding of 
the psychology of extremism, the field of psychology can develop insights into the 
motivations that lead individuals to develop extremist patterns of alignment with the 
group, help to identify what characteristics of a group may encourage extremism, help to 
predict which groups may be supporting the kinds of behaviors associated with violent 
extremism, and contribute to research on the negotiation with extremist groups and 
members of extremist groups.  This research contributes to this overall goal by 
demonstrating the connections between identity fusion and the state of extremism.
Some specific implications that arise from this work suggest that researchers in 
the psychology of extremism should develop an appreciation of the role of the self-
concept in explaining phenomena associated with extremism.  Research on real-world 
extremist organizations should focus on the role of these organizations in meeting 
specific self-related needs for their members, and attempts to reduce the formation of 
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these groups should focus on developing alternative methods that potential group 
members  can use to meet these needs.  
Future research is necessary to explore and more fully lay out the relationship 
between identification, identity fusion, and extremism.  Future research should replicate 
the findings of Studies 2 and 3 using a larger sample of more politically committed 
participants, so that there will be a strong representation of fused participants. 
Replications of Study 1 using a more significant manipulation of social group than just 
online discussions would also be useful. Additional research is particularly needed to 
identify the relationship between self-verification needs and identity fusion, and should 
focus on using a variety of different groups or groups which have been pre-selected to 
match the self-views of the participants in the study.  
Taken as a whole, this dissertation provides one approach to defining the state of 
extremism and one potential explanation of the underlying psychology.  While the data 
are not completely uniform in supporting this explanation, they do provide interesting 
support for the argument that extremism is related to identity fusion concerns.  More 
research is necessary, but this approach may continue to serve as an effective model for 
understanding extremism in the future.  
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Appendix A: Measuring Fusion
Identity fusion is theorized to exist as a particular psychological state in which the 
connection between the personal and social levels of the self-concept are strong enough 
that there is functionally or activationally little difference between the two of them.  The 
identity fusion scale is one attempt to assess this state, based on Aron’s research in the 
pictorial assessment of the self-concept which demonstrates that similar scales do 
accurately measure the relationship between different aspects of the self (e.g. Aron, Aron, 
Tudor, & Nelson, 1991).  The state of fusion is theorized to be a binary state: although 
associations between the personal and the social self can vary in strength, if fusion is 
considered a condition in which there is functionally no difference between the two then 
it should be best considered as a binary condition in which either participants are fused 
and there is no difference, or they are not and some difference exists.  Given that the 
identity fusion scale is a continuous measure, this poses a question of psychometrics: 
what is the most appropriate way to define this categorical state of fusion from this 
continuous measure?
Existing research has used three separate approaches to defining fusion from the 
identity fusion scale.  The approach which shows the strongest face validity and 
theoretical support is defining fusion as a response of “E” on the identity fusion scale (see 
Figure 4.1. By placing the “self” circle within the large circle of the group, option E
shows the strongest degree of association between the self and the group and corresponds 
most closely to the theoretical definition of fusion.  This is the definition which most 
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existing research uses for the majority of analyses (e.g. Swann, Seyle, Gomez, Morales, 
& Huici, 2007).  There is a practical problem with this, however: as should be expected if 
fusion really does represent a powerful psychological state and one related to extremism, 
the rates of people selecting response E in the US is relatively rare.  While research 
conducted in Spain (a collectivistic culture more comfortable drawing associations 
between the self and the group) has found rates of fusion with the national identity that 
average between 25 and 30 percent (Swann, Seyle, Gomez, Morales, & Huici, 2007), 
research on similar national identification in the United States has found rates closer to 7 
percent (Seyle & Swann, 2005).  The usage of response E in the studies presented in this 
dissertation was particularly low (most likely attributable to the fact that the groups 
focused on were not particularly relevant to the majority of participants in the studies): 
rates of this response varied from 5.1% in Study 1 to 8.1% in Study 3.  While this low 
response rate is in line with what should be expected if fusion really is associated with 
extremism (as extremism is a rare psychological state), this poses significant problems 
for the analyses: without a large sample, there are many questions which cannot be 
effectively answered.
A second approach to defining fusion which has been used before (e.g. Seyle & 
Swann, 2006) is to define fusion as a response of D or E on the identity fusion scale.  The 
primary reason for this is that while response E shows the most theoretical validity, there 
is the psychometric issue that some people are more inclined in general to use the 
extremes of scales, while others avoid them (e.g. Johnson, Kulesa, Cho, & Shavitt, 2005).  
If this is the case, then it is possible that a certain proportion of fused participants are 
119
avoiding selecting response E out of this kind of response bias or just general 
measurement noise.  Therefore, while almost everyone who selects E is very likely to be 
fused, there’s also the possibility that many people who are fused are not selecting E.  By 
lowering the breakpoint for fusion to response D, researchers are likely to accurately 
categorize the vast majority of fused participants by catching those fused participants 
who did not select E.  Such a categorization will inevitably increase the number of non-
fused participants incorrectly categorized as fused, but as the result of this will be to 
increase the variance of the fused group and obscure any real effects for fusion rather 
than encourage Type I error this is not as critical of an issue as it could be if the effect 
worked in the other direction.
This theoretical justification is based on the idea that E is the strongest way of 
capturing fused participants, but D may be almost as strong.  If this is the case, there 
should be a significant drop-off in the strength of the fusion scale in predicting dependent 
variables between C and D.  The relationship between the fusion scale and other 
measures should not be a linear relationship, but rather sigmoidal, with a break between 
responses A-C and responses D and E.  If such a pattern is found, creating the fused 
categorization at response D and E may be a legitimate approach.  Research in Spain has 
tended to show a sigmoidal response with a break between C and D but a larger and more 
significant break between D and E (Swann, Seyle, Gomez, Morales, & Huici, 2007).  
Research in the US has tended to show less of a difference between D and E and a 
stronger gap between C and D (Seyle & Swann, 2005).
120
A third approach that has been used very rarely treats the identity fusion scale as a 
continuous measure (Swann, Seyle, Gomez, Morales, & Huici, 2007, Study 1).  If fusion 
is a binary state, this is psychometrically less valid than the other approaches.  If, 
however, fusion is best conceptualized as a spectrum of association between the personal 
and social self-view ranging from not fused to completely fused then the sigmoidal shape 
described above should not found in the association between fusion and other measures 
and treating the identity fusion scale as a continuous measure might be appropriate.
The very small numbers of participants answering E on the identity fusion scale in 
the studies presented in this dissertation posed a problem for analysis.  While this is the 
strongest way to categorize fusion, a lack of fused participants using this definition meant 
that many of the analyses were either impossible to run or unreliable.  Because of this, the 
alternate definitions fusion discussed here were considered.  In order to determine if it 
was more appropriate to consider fusion as a dichotomous variable with a cutoff at 
response D or treat it as a continuous variable, I looked at the association between fusion 
and other measures in the three studies.  Because the state of fusion is assumed to be 
associated with a high degree of identification and in order to make the analyses 
comparable across all three studies, I compared the response of participants on the 
identity fusion scale to their response on the organizational identification questionnaire
by computing an ANOVA for each study treating the identity fusion scale as a single 6-
level factor.  In all three studies, these analyses demonstrated a roughly sigmoidal shape 
in line with the idea that fusion is a dichotomous state, not a continuous variable.  Results 
for these analyses are shown in Figure A.1.  In Study 1, the overall ANOVA is significant 
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(F(6,346)= 21.4, p<.001) and Tukey post-hoc tests show that response D is significantly 
higher than responses A-C (p’s <.01) but significantly lower than response E (p<.01).  
For Studies 2 and 3 the overall comparisons are likewise significant (F(4,180) = 11.967,
F(4,190) = 15.17, respectively. p's<.001).  In Study 2, response D is significantly higher 
than responses A-C (p’s <.001) but not significantly different from response E, which is 
itself higher than all other conditions except C and D (p’s<.001).  In Study 3, there was 
no significant difference between participants who responded with D or E, but both D 
and E were significantly higher than all other groups (p’s<.01).
Figure A.1: Identification scores across responses to the fusion scale
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These results are in keeping with findings from earlier studies, which support the 
argument that fusion is a dichotomous state best operationally defined as a response at the 
high end of the identity fusion scale, not as a continuous measurement on the identity 
fusion scale.  Research with Spanish participants has consistently supported a similar 
finding that the response across the fusion scale is not a smooth, continuous increase, but 
instead driven by the responses at the higher ends of the scale, in that Spanish participants 
tend to draw a sharp distinction between the high ends of the fusion scale and the middle 
parts of the scale (Swann, Seyle, Gomez, Morales, & Huici, 2007).  Given this, it is most 
appropriate to treat fusion as a categorical variable.  While selecting only those who 
responded E on the fusion scale is still the most rigorous definition of fusion, in the case 
of these studies this would pose serious analytical problems. The analyses here suggest 
that the next best approach is to define fusion as a score of either D or E on the identity 
fusion scale.  The analyses presented in this dissertation take this form.
ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN FUSION AND OTHER PSYCHOLOGICAL VARIABLES
In order to develop a picture of how fusion is associated with other variables, the 
data across all three studies were combined and the relationship between fusion, age, 
gender, and identification with the group was assessed.  Theoretically, fusion should be 
unrelated to either gender or age, but associated with identification.  In the case of age, 
this was assessed with a t-test, which found no significant difference between fused and 
unfused participants (t(732) = .385).  See Figure A.2.  In the case of gender, this was 
assessed with a binary logistic regression including gender as a predictor and fusion as 
the dependent variable.  Although women show a slightly higher rate of fusion than men, 
this difference was not significant (OR = 1.368, p=.063).  See Figure A.3.  
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Identification was tested with a t-test, which found that fused participants showed 
significantly higher rates of identification with their self-identified political affiliation 
than nonfused participants (t(729) = -15.35, p<.001).  See Figure A.4.  This is consistent 
with the theoretical argument that fusion represents a particularly strong form of 
association with the group.  Identification with the group is a measure of how much a 
particular group is important to the respondent, and how much the respondent sees that 
group as being significant to their life.  Because of this, it is expected that fused 
participants (who are argued to see the group as being an externalization of the self) 
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should show high rates of identification.  This analysis found the predicted relationship 
between fusion and identification.
Although fusion is associated with identification, it is distinct in several key ways.  
Identification represents a cognitive, explicit awareness that the group is important to the 
group member.  Fusion, conceptualized as a state in which the boundaries between the 
self and the group become blurred, is theorized to be a much stronger state more 
associated with affective and noncognitive affiliation with the group.  Although fusion 
presupposes a high degree of identification (as found in this analysis), it is conceptualized 
to be distinct and likely more powerful in terms of the results it evokes.  In order to test 
this assumption, analyses in this dissertation controlled for identification to determine to
what degree this theorized distinction between the two constructs was found in the data.














Appendix B: Political Discussions in Study 1
CONSERVATIVE DISCUSSION
MJOates
If you really think about it, Bush has not really done anything _that_ bad 
as a president. I think that taking a stance on the war and actually doing 
something about it shows that he is a strong president, and I feel safe with 
him defending our country against terrorists.
Wilde
He is fighting for what he believes in and that I admire. A man that can 
stand up and live and breath his own morals is rare and something most 
people can't admit doing. He has represented the US well and I really 
appreciate him not accepting this nonsense about gay-marriage. Bush is 
probably the greatest role model this country has.
Allie I don’t really care very much. I don’t pay any attention to politics. Their all the same anway. It doesn’t matter who is in charge
HU07
I’m pretty conservative, but I actually don’t like the guy very much. In 
theory, I agree with his politics but I don’t like the way that he’s been 
running his administration. It seems like he's putting loyalty over 
competence, and ignoring huge problems with America (immigration? 
Hello?). Plus, he ran as an isolationist but his foreign policy is getting us 
involved with too much stuff internationally.
rigmarole
I like how the president supports business and the economy. He realizes 
that the key to a strong country is a strong economy. I remember during
his first term when there were enormous numbers of layoffs after the tech 
bubble burst--he extended unemployment benefits for many people 
affected (including me). That really helped me get by.
Sally08 I agree. I think the President is doing a great job, despite all the anti-




That guy gives me the creeps whenever I see him on TV. Constantly 
making a fool of himself and building a horrible image of the US. I really 
hate this war, his stance on gay marriage, and how he knows absolutely 
nothing about the youth of america. Take this net-neutrality issue--if he 
wasn't so big business he would have encouraged our senate to not even 
consider such bull.
Wilde
The main problem with President Bush is that he ignores the needs of 98% 
of the population in order to please his supporters, the wealthiest 2% of 
the nation. I also dislike how he embraces really dumb policies, like 
abstinence-only sex ed in public schools--more teens are getting pregnant 
and getting stds under this policy because they keep having sex but they're 
not informed about how to be safe. Overall, he's just really unlikeable.
Allie I don’t really care very much. I don’t pay any attention to politics. Their all the same anway. It doesn’t matter who is in charge
HU07
He's not all bad. He's been pretty solid on gay rights, considering the 
pressures around him -- look how he headed off the gay marriage 
amendment thing. Declared himself leading the charge, and then killed it. 
And Condi Rice and Dick Cheney are probably the most gay positive 
high-profile people in an administration ever. 
rigmarole Two wars, countless human rights abuses, and the ecomony and environment going into the toilet. Yeehaw! 
Sally08 I agree. I think that Bush is just too conservative for America, and I think he lies a lot.
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Appendix C: Materials Used in Study 2
COUNTERFACTUALS AND RESISTANCE MEASURES
Political condition
We are interested in people’s perceptions of political arguments.  Specifically, we are 
interested in people’s thinking about “what-ifs” of different political opinions: what 
people think should be done in a variety of different situations.  For each “what-if” we 
will ask you how easy or difficult it is to imagine that the starting point for the “what-if” 
could be true, and how easy or difficult it is to believe the proposed effect would happen 
if that starting point was true.  Some of the “what-if” statements may appear to be 
obviously true to you, and you may find some of them to be controversial.  Please answer 
as best as you can.
      1. Consider the argument that if the United States is shown to have acted immorally 
(by mistakenly killing innocent people or supporting genocide, for example), the 
United States should not be looked to as a moral nation.  
1a. How easy or difficult is it to imagine that the starting point for this argument 
could have been true?  Is it easy or difficult to accept the premise that the U.S. 
may have acted immorally at some point in the past or will in the future?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Extremely    Neither easy      Extremely 
 easy     nor difficult        difficult
1b. Assuming, just for the sake of argument that the starting point is reasonable 
(putting aside your personal views on the subject), how easy or difficult is it to 
imagine the consequences following?  Assuming that if the U.S. is shown to 
have acted immorally, does it follow in your mind that the U.S. should not be 
seen as a moral nation?
1           2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Extremely    Neither easy      Extremely 
 easy     nor difficult        difficult
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      2. Consider the argument that if racial profiling is shown to be an effective means of 
preventing crime without placing an undue burden on targeted groups, then law 
enforcement should engage in racial profiling.
2a. How easy or difficult is it to imagine that the starting point for this argument 
could have been true?  Is it easy or difficult to accept the premise that racial 
profiling may be shown to be an effective means of preventing crime without 
placing an undue burden on targeted groups?
2b. Assuming, just for the sake of argument that the starting point is reasonable 
(putting aside your personal views on the subject), how easy or difficult is it to 
imagine the consequences following?  Assuming that if racial profiling is 
shown to be an effective way of preventing crime without placing an undue 
burden on targeted groups, does it follow in your mind that law enforcement 
should engage in racial profiling?
      3. Consider the argument that if someone is born into an environment that does not 
provide opportunities for advancement, then that person will not be unable to 
escape that environment.
3a. How easy or difficult is it to imagine that the starting point for this argument 
could have been true?  Is it easy or difficult to accept the premise that 
someone might be born into an environment that does not provide 
opportunities for advancement?
3b. Assuming, just for the sake of argument that the starting point is reasonable 
(putting aside your personal views on the subject), how easy or difficult is it to 
imagine the consequences following?  Assuming that if someone is born into 
an environment without opportunities for advancement, does it follow in you 
mind that that person will be unable to escape that environment?
      4. Consider the argument that if an unprovoked attack on another nation is shown to 
be the only way to stop an immoral action (such as genocide) in another country, 
then the U.S. should launch an unprovoked attack. 
4a. How easy or difficult is it to imagine that the starting point for this argument 
could have been true?  Is it easy or difficult to accept the premise that an 
unprovoked attack may be the only way to stop an immoral action?
4b. Assuming, just for the sake of argument that the starting point is reasonable 
(putting aside your personal views on the subject), how easy or difficult is it to 
imagine the consequences following?  Assuming that if an unprovoked attack 
is the only way to stop an immoral action in another country, does it follow in 
your mind that the U.S. should launch an attack?
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      5. Consider the argument that if a traditional two-parent family includes parents who 
treat their child very poorly, that child would be better off in a nontraditional 
family who care for the child.    
5a. How easy or difficult is it to imagine that the starting point for this argument 
could have been true?  Is it easy or difficult to accept the premise that 
traditional family structures may include parents who treat their children 
poorly?
5b. Assuming, just for the sake of argument that the starting point is reasonable 
(putting aside your personal views on the subject), how easy or difficult is it to 
imagine the consequences following?  Assuming that if a traditional family 
structure is shown to include parents who mistreat the child, does it follow in 
your mind that the child would be better off in a nontraditional family who 
cares for the child?
  6. Consider the argument that if a pure free-market capitalistic approach (which 
includes no social programs such as welfare or social security) is shown to be the 
best way to improve the overall standard of living in the U.S., then the United 
States should end social programs such as welfare and reduce regulation of 
corporations and businesses.  
6a. How easy or difficult is it to imagine that the starting point for this argument 
could have been true?  Is it easy or difficult to accept the premise a pure free-
market approach would be the best way to improve the overall standard of 
living in the United States?
6b. Assuming, just for the sake of argument that the starting point is reasonable 
(putting aside your personal views on the subject), how easy or difficult is it to 
imagine the consequences following?  Assuming that if a pure free-market 
approach is shown to be the best way to improve the standard of living, does it 
follow in your mind that the U.S. should end social programs and reduce 
regulation of corporations?
      7. Consider the argument that if the government is unable to accomplish all its 
obligations without raising taxes, then the government should raise taxes.   
7a. How easy or difficult is it to imagine that the starting point for this argument 
could have been true?  Is it easy or difficult to accept the premise that the 
government may be unable to accomplish all its obligations without raising 
taxed?
7b. Assuming, just for the sake of argument that the starting point is reasonable 
(putting aside your personal views on the subject), how easy or difficult is it to 
imagine the consequences following?  Assuming that if the government is 
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unable to accomplish its obligations without raising taxed, does it follow in 
your mind that the government should then raise taxes?
      8. Consider the argument that if it is shown that laws allowing individuals to more 
easily buy and carry handguns reduce crime without appreciably increasing 
accidental deaths, then the government should make it easier to buy and carry 
handguns.    
8a. How easy or difficult is it to imagine that the starting point for this argument 
could have been true?  Is it easy or difficult to accept the premise that making 
it easier to buy or carry handguns will reduce crime without appreciably 
increasing accidental deaths.
8b. Assuming, just for the sake of argument that the starting point is reasonable 
(putting aside your personal views on the subject), how easy or difficult is it to 
imagine the consequences following?  Assuming that if it is shown that 
making it easier to buy and carry handguns reduces crime without increasing 
accidental deaths, does it follow in your mind that the government should 
make it easier to buy and carry handguns?
Nonpolitical condition
We are interested in people’s perceptions of some different causal arguments (arguments 
about how things may happen).  Specifically, we are interested in people’s thinking about 
“what-ifs”: what perceptions people have of how events may conceivably work out 
differently if the starting point is different.  Please answer each of the following 
questions.  For each “what-if” we will ask you how easy or difficult it is to imagine that 
the starting point for the “what-if” could be true, and how easy or difficult it is to imagine 
what might have happened differently if that starting point is true.  Some of the “what-if” 
statements may appear to be obviously true to you, and you may find some of them to be 
controversial.  Please answer as best as you can.
      1. Consider the argument that if an organization formerly seen as a moral 
organization was found to have acted immorally, then that organization should not 
be seen as a moral group.  
1a. How easy or difficult is it to imagine that the starting point for this argument 
could have been true?  Is it easy or difficult to accept the premise that an 
organization seen as moral may be found to have acted imorally?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Extremely    Neither easy      Extremely 
 easy     nor difficult        difficult
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1b. Assuming, just for the sake of argument that the starting point is reasonable 
(putting aside your personal views on the subject), how easy or difficult is it to 
imagine the consequences following?  Assuming that if the an organization is 
found to have acted immorally, does it follow in your mind that the group 
should not be seen as moral?
1           2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Extremely    Neither easy      Extremely 
 easy     nor difficult        difficult
      2. Consider the argument that if a person does not have the opportunity to learn to 
perform some action, they will not be able to successfully perform that action.
2a. How easy or difficult is it to imagine that the starting point for this argument
could have been true?  Is it easy or difficult to accept the premise that 
someone may not have the chance to learn to perform some action?
2b. Assuming, just for the sake of argument that the starting point is reasonable 
(putting aside your personal views on the subject), how easy or difficult is it to 
imagine the consequences following?  Assuming that if someone does not 
have the chance to learn to perform some action, does it follow in your mind 
that they will not be able to successfully perform that action?
      3. Consider the argument that if some group or organization is not performing well 
at some task, then a different group organized in a different fashion may perform 
better.
3a. How easy or difficult is it to imagine that the starting point for this argument 
could have been true?  Is it easy or difficult to accept the premise that a group 
or organization may not perform well at some task?
3b. Assuming, just for the sake of argument that the starting point is reasonable 
(putting aside your personal views on the subject), how easy or difficult is it to 
imagine the consequences following?  Assuming that if a group or 
organization is not performing well at a task, does it follow in your mind that 
a group or organization organized along different lines may perform better?
      4. Consider the argument that if a group or organization cannot meet their 
obligations with the funding they already have, then the group should raise the 
money.. 
4a. How easy or difficult is it to imagine that the starting point for this argument 
could have been true?  Is it easy or difficult to accept the premise that a group 
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or organization may be unable to meet their obligations with the funding they 
have?
4b. Assuming, just for the sake of argument that the starting point is reasonable 
(putting aside your personal views on the subject), how easy or difficult is it to 
imagine the consequences following?  Assuming that if there is a group that 
can’t meet their obligations with the funding they have, does it follow in your
mind that the group should raise the money?
      5. Consider the argument that if an organization has the opportunity to stop immoral 
behavior in another group, then that organization should act to stop this behavior.    
5a. How easy or difficult is it to imagine that the starting point for this argument 
could have been true?  Is it easy or difficult to accept the premise that an 
organization may have the opportunity to stop immoral behavior in another 
group?
5b. Assuming, just for the sake of argument that the starting point is reasonable 
(putting aside your personal views on the subject), how easy or difficult is it to 
imagine the consequences following?  Assuming that if an organization does 
have the chance to stop immoral behavior in another group, does it follow in 
your mind that the organization should act to stop this behavior?
      6. Consider the argument that if a group knows an effective way to accomplish its 
goals, then that group should use this method.
6a. How easy or difficult is it to imagine that the starting point for this argument 
could have been true?  Is it easy or difficult to accept the premise that a group 
may know an effective way of accomplishing its goals?
6b. Assuming, just for the sake of argument that the starting point is reasonable 
(putting aside your personal views on the subject), how easy or difficult is it to 
imagine the consequences following?  Assuming that if a group does have an 
effective means of accomplishing its goals, does it follow in your mind that 
the group should use this method?
      7. Consider the argument that if regulations hinder or prevent a beneficial outcome, 
then the government should remover those regulations.   
7a. How easy or difficult is it to imagine that the starting point for this argument 
could have been true?  Is it easy or difficult to accept the premise that 
regulations may hinder or prevent a beneficial outcome?
7b. Assuming, just for the sake of argument that the starting point is reasonable 
(putting aside your personal views on the subject), how easy or difficult is it to 
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imagine the consequences following?  Assuming that if regulations do hinder 
or prevent a beneficial outcome, does it follow in your mind that the 
government should remove these regulations?
      8. Consider the argument that if research shows that resistance to some proposed 
policy or law is based on incorrect information about the effects of this policy, 
then resistance should stop.    
8a. How easy or difficult is it to imagine that the starting point for this argument 
could have been true?  Is it easy or difficult to accept the premise that 
resistance to some proposed policy or law could be based on incorrect 
information about that policy’s effects?
8b. Assuming, just for the sake of argument that the starting point is reasonable 
(putting aside your personal views on the subject), how easy or difficult is it to 
imagine the consequences following?  Assuming that if it is shown that 
resistance to a law or policy is based on incorrect information about the 
effects of that law or policy, does it follow in your mind that the resistance 
should then stop?
MORAL OUTRAGE AND EMOTION MEASURES
Political condition
Now, we would like you to consider your response to an author who wrote a book 
endorsing each of the “what-if” statements regarding political opinions.  For each 
statement, we will ask you to consider what your response would be to a book that argued 
that the “what-if” statement was true.
1. What would you think about somebody who wrote a book endorsing the idea that 
the U.S. had behaved immorally and should not be seen as a moral nation?
Please indicate how much you agree with each of the following statements
      1.  This person is likely to admire people who disagree with him or her
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
 Completely        Unsure       Completely
      disagree       agree
      2.  This person is likely to have contempt for people who disagree with him or her
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
      Completely        Unsure       Completely
      disagree       agree
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3.  This person displays a great understanding of American history
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
      Completely        Unsure       Completely
      disagree       agree
      4.  I would seek out this person’s company.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
      Completely        Unsure       Completely
      disagree       agree
      5. My emotional reaction to this argument is:
a.  Anger
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Disagree         unsure         Agree
             strongly         strongly
      b.  Sorrow
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Disagree         unsure         Agree
             strongly         strongly
      c. Disappointment 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Disagree         unsure Agree
             strongly         strongly
      d. Hope
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Disagree         unsure         Agree
             strongly         strongly
2. What would you think about somebody who wrote a book endorsing the idea that 
racial profiling is an effective means of preventing crime without placing an 
undue burden on targeted groups, and that law enforcement should engage in 
racial profiling?
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3. What would you think about somebody who wrote a book arguing that people 
who born into environments without opportunities will not be able to escape those 
environments?
      4. What would you think about somebody who wrote a book arguing that an 
unprovoked attack is the only way to stop an immoral action, and the U.S. should 
therefore launch an unprovoked attack?
      5. What would you think about somebody who wrote a book arguing that if a 
traditional two-parent family includes parents who treat their child very poorly, 
that child would be better off in a nontraditional family who care for the child? 
      6. What would you think about somebody who wrote a book arguing that a pure 
free-market capitalistic approach (which includes no social programs such as 
welfare or social security) is the best way to improve the overall standard of living 
in the U.S., and that the United States should end social programs such as welfare 
and reduce regulation of corporations and businesses?  
      7. What would you think about somebody who wrote a book arguing that the 
government is unable to accomplish all its obligations without raising taxes, and 
should raise taxes?
8. What would you think about somebody who wrote a book arguing that laws 
allowing individuals to more easily buy and carry handguns reduce crime without 
appreciably increasing accidental deaths, and the government should make it 
easier to buy and carry handguns?    
Nonpolitical condition
Now, we would like you to consider your response to an author who wrote a book 
endorsing each of the “what-if” statements.  For each statement, we will ask you to 
consider what your response would be to a book that argued that the “what-if” statement 
was true.
1. What would you think about somebody who wrote a book endorsing the idea that 
if an organization formerly seen as a moral organization was found to have acted 
immorally, then that organization should not be seen as a moral group?
Please indicate how much you agree with each of the following statements
      1.  This person is likely to admire people who disagree with him or her
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
      Completely        Unsure       Completely
      disagree       agree
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      2.  This person is likely to have contempt for people who disagree with him or her
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
      Completely        Unsure       Completely
      disagree       agree
3.  This person displays a great understanding of American history
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
      Completely        Unsure       Completely
      disagree       agree
      4.  I would seek out this person’s company.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
      Completely        Unsure       Completely
      disagree       agree
      5. My emotional reaction to this argument is:
a.  Anger
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Disagree         unsure         Agree
             strongly         strongly
      b.  Sorrow
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Disagree         unsure         Agree
             strongly         strongly
      c. Disappointment 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Disagree         unsure         Agree
             strongly         strongly
      d. Hope
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Disagree         unsure         Agree
             strongly         strongly
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2. What would you think about somebody who wrote a book endorsing the idea that 
that if a person does not have the opportunity to learn to perform some action, 
they will not be able to successfully perform that action?
3. What would you think about somebody who wrote a book arguing that if research 
shows that resistance to some proposed policy or law is based on incorrect 
information about the effects of this policy, then resistance should stop?
      4. What would you think about somebody who wrote a book arguing that if some 
group or organization is not performing well at some task, then a different group 
organized in a different fashion may perform better?
      5. What would you think about somebody who wrote a book arguing that if a group 
or organization cannot meet their obligations with the funding they already have, 
then the group should raise the money? 
      6. What would you think about somebody who wrote a book arguing that if an 
organization has the opportunity to stop immoral behavior in another group, then 
that organization should act to stop this behavior?  
      7. What would you think about somebody who wrote a book arguing that if a group 
knows an effective way to accomplish its goals, then that group should use this 
method?
      8. What would you think about somebody who wrote a book arguing that if 
regulations hinder or prevent a beneficial outcome, then the government should 
remover those regulations?    
MORAL CLEANSING MEASURE
Please respond to the next few items using the following scale:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Certain no        Unsure     Certain yes
1. How likely are you to vote in the next presidential election?
2. How likely are you to vote in the next national election?
3. How likely are you to vote in the next state election?
4. How likely are you to donate money to your political party in the next two years?
5. How likely are you to volunteer for a political party or candidate in the next two 
years?
6. How likely are you to run for local, state, or national office in the next five years?
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Appendix D: Materials used in Study 3
LINGUISTIC MEASURES:
Now, we would like you to think about your political affiliation and your answers to 
some of the earlier questions. For each of the following questions, write as much as you 
need to answer the question fully. Please try and explain your answer as thoroughly as 
possible
1. What does the group the participant’s self-identified affiliation mean to you?
2.  On the last page, you selected this response: participant’s response on the 
identity fusion scale.  Why did you select that?  What did that picture mean 
to you?
3.  Describe how you see the average conservative. What makes the average 
conservative see him or herself as conservative?
4.  Describe how you see the average liberal. What makes the average liberal 
see him or herself as liberal?
5.   Describe how you see conservatives as a group.
6.  Describe how you see liberals as a group.
IMPACT OF ISSUES ON VOTING DECISIONS MEASURE
Now we would like to ask you some questions about your political decisions.  Please 
imagine that you are deciding whether to vote for a candidate or not.  Think about the 
issues that affect your decision to vote for this candidate.  Please respond to the following 
questions about your voting decisions.
We will present you with a series of political issues.  For each one, please respond with 
how this issue affects your voting decisions using the following scale:





Will not vote 
for a candidate
who disagrees 
with me on this 
issue
1.  Abortion
2.  Tax relief
3.  The war on drugs
4.  National security
5.  The war on terror
6.  Social Security
7.  Welfare reform
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COMBATIVE POLITICS MEASURE
Now, we would like you to think about your attitudes toward politics in general.  
Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements, 
using this scale:











1.  A politician should never give up something he or she believes as a part of a 
political compromise
2.  The political party opposing participant’s affiliation is entirely wrong: they 
have no positions at all that I agree with
3.  When a candidate is elected, this means that he or she has been given a 
mandate by the voters to push their agenda regardless of what the minority of 
voters feel
4.  In American politics the losing party should have no influence in government
5.  Political compromise is never a good idea
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